Lazar, Sternenko und Flash – wer sind die Leute, die Verteidigungsminister Fedorov in seinem Team zusammengestellt hat, und was das Militär von ihm erwartet

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For almost a month now, Ukraine and the Defense Forces have had a new Minister of Defense — 35-year-old Mykhailo Fedorov.

He is the fourth head of the Ministry of Defense during the full-scale war with Russia. And the first one on whom, given his brilliant results at the Ministry of Digital Transformation, great hopes are being placed by the military, civilians, and especially the president. Probably even excessively high ones.

For this piece, we surveyed servicemembers of different levels — from UAV operators in line brigades to high-ranking officers. And we were surprised by how strongly our interlocutors, who over these years of war could confidently be called “military atheists,” believe in Fedorov.

“If Madyar was the hope of 2025, then Misha (Fedorov – UP) is the hope of 2026. He’s a cosmic guy. I hope everything works out for him, and big changes await us,” one officer who until recently worked with the Commander-in-Chief tells UP off the record.

“Ukrainska Pravda” reports what we learned about Fedorov during his first month in office, why the bet on Sternenko and “Flash” as his advisers, at least for now, looks entirely organic, and what specific changes await the military.

**The Time of the Ministry of Defense**

For most of our interlocutors in both military and political circles, the replacement of the minister of defense at the beginning of 2026 came as a rather unexpected event.

They say Denys Shmyhal had only just begun to get up to speed — and theoretically should have been able to handle another position in the government. And Fedorov himself, although over the past few years he had worked mainly on developing products for the front, supposedly did not plan to take the chair of minister of defense.

“Everything we have at the front right now shows that we are losing… Probably the president wants to turn this around. And he believes in Fedorov. I also very much hope for changes,” a high-ranking officer from the command of one of the corps cautiously shares his thoughts with UP.

“Misha is our only hope. The last hope,” another officer, who currently works in the field of “small air defense,” says about Fedorov’s appointment — half-jokingly or perhaps seriously.

The next question that comes to mind is: why, then, does the president not replace the commander-in-chief himself?

Some of our interlocutors are convinced that Fedorov’s drive to measure performance — which will be discussed a bit later — will not bypass the commander-in-chief either in 2–3 months. And then, based on the results of a conditional audit, a decision will be made regarding the current head of the armed forces.

Others firmly maintain that the president is fully satisfied with Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, and that Fedorov’s role is merely to strengthen him.

They argue that, despite noticeable fatigue, the commander-in-chief knows the battlefield well — and there is currently no alternative candidate who would agree to carry the burden of leading the military.

How did the military leadership react to Fedorov’s appointment?

“The entire military can be conditionally divided into progressive and conservative parts,” one officer who worked with the commander-in-chief tells UP off the record. “All the progressive, younger ones are for Misha. Conservative, well-known officers say: ‘Come on, this is bullsh*t.’ The CGS (Chief of the General Staff, Andrii Hnatov – UP) accepts Misha, and Syrskyi, as far as I know, is skeptical of him.”

Almost a month ago, on January 14, Fedorov did not just enter but literally burst into the world of the Ministry of Defense with a very visible desire to change the rules of how it functions. More precisely, the rules of interaction between the ministry on the one hand and the General Staff, the commander-in-chief, and the military on the other.

Fedorov is clearly not satisfied with the role of minister of defense solely as a person responsible for procurement for the army.

Given his ambitions, capabilities, and the challenges facing the state and the military, this is objectively not enough for him. From the outset, he sets himself a strategic task — to kill 50,000 Russians per month and make the war unbearable for the enemy.

Moreover, the president wants significantly more from him — to protect the sky from Shaheds, to “sort out the issue of busification,” to make contracts for servicemembers effective, and to increase the supply of drones to the army.

Essentially, to solve the lion’s share of problems that neither ministers nor the General Staff have managed to cope with so far.

A few days after his appointment, Fedorov gathered journalists for a closed meeting, where for almost three hours he spoke about his plans in a field already familiar to him — drones, technology, and so on. He also addressed such “white spots” as mobilization and fortifications, the study of which requires more data and time.

Without any exaggeration, Fedorov can be called a newly appointed minister who is “deep in the subject” — at least in the sphere already known to him.

He knows the depth of the kill zone on both sides of the front, understands that part of the available artillery — because of that same kill zone — often cannot reach enemy positions, realizes where Ukraine has weak spots in countering Shaheds, and emphasizes that the Defense Forces need cheap missiles.

At the same time, Fedorov knows what irritates the military in their interaction with the state and smooths over these rough edges — as, for example, with the recent automation of drone distribution.

Even while serving as minister of digital transformation, he monitored which military teams could be strengthened — for example, in the field of interceptor drones, Oleksandr Yarmak, commander of the DarkNode battalion of the 412th Nemesis Brigade, tells UP.

“When in the spring of 2025 we achieved significant success in shooting down Shaheds with interceptor drones, Mykhailo’s team began doing everything possible to ensure the state contracted several of the most effective interceptor drones and radar systems. Consultations took place at any time of day, and it was very constructive work,” Yarmak recalls.

“Almost everything Fedorov is talking about now concerns the battlefield, and that is the level of the General Staff. But at the same time — who said the Ministry of Defense should be just a procurement body? This vertical is completely broken.

It should be like this: president – minister – General Staff. The minister should be the direct superior of the General Staff; the General Staff should not be a separate organism. There must be a single vertical for everything, as, for example, in the Ministry of Internal Affairs,” says MP and member of the security committee Roman Kostenko.

Both at the Ministry of Digital Transformation and at the Ministry of Defense, Fedorov adheres to the idea that all work quality must be measured. He proposes making 100% of decisions based on data, introducing a clear ranking of commanders, and faster transitioning to a unified system for all drone operations — Mission Control.

This offers a huge advantage, namely speed and transparency. And at the same time, a small caveat from the military, who know that not everything in war can be measured in numbers.

Units that lead the E-points rankings — and which Fedorov admires — are not responsible for a specific sector of the front. They often have the privilege to choose the “fattest” targets in terms of E-point “payment,” ignore neighboring units (for example, not share streams and specifics of weapon use), and are also given priority in personnel allocation.

Meanwhile, mechanized brigades are forced to constantly think about how to snatch at least a couple of people for the infantry from the training center.