Ein neuer CSIS-Bericht zeigt, dass chinesische Forschungsschiffe deutlich mehr Zeit in der Nähe von Unterseekabeln auf hoher See verbringen als andere Länder

Submission Statement:

A new CSIS report analyzed nearly six years of AIS tracking data on 223 research vessels from 48 countries to test whether Chinese “scientific” ships behave differently from other research fleets. The report finds that PRC research vessels spend a statistically significant larger share of their time near subsea cables and pipelines on the high seas, where coastal-state consent via UNCLOS isn’t required, with a notable spike in 2024. Two case studies, the *Xiang Yang Hong 06* near Guam and the *Ke Xue* in the Western Pacific and Bering Sea, show survey-like patterns over U.S.- and allied-owned cables, likely to find exact locations and collect data to cut cables during a potential Taiwan conflict. This report uses statistics and regression models to quantify the findings, finding statistical significance n the findings. This poses an interesting question on how the U.S. should look at and protect subsea cables in a potential future conflict.