Die politische Ökonomie des Krieges gegen den Iran: Ein Interview mit Adam Hanieh

This analysis sees GCC countries more tied to the U.S. than ever. But adding reconciliation with Israel into the equation does not produce a stable order.

>The Emirati overland pipeline to Fujairah, Saudi pipelines to the Red Sea, and improved road and port connections within the UAE might reduce pressure on some crude exports, but I do not think they can easily replace the density of intermodal infrastructure built up in the Gulf over many decades. Again, we need to remember that the Gulf states are not just exporters of oil—pipelines cannot transport fertilizers, chemicals, foodstuffs, and other commodities that are produced in the region. Such alternative infrastructures are also vulnerable to military attack and sabotage.

>…Today, the Gulf states are deeply embedded in the US political economy through equity markets, involvement in private equity and hedge funds, sovereign wealth investments, and other financial channels—alongside the continued consumption of US military hardware. They also share with the Trump administration the same commitment to a fossil fuel-centered world. This makes the Gulf an active component in the reproduction of American power, not just passive clients.

>…The repressive capacities of the Gulf states are stronger than they were then, and I think the space for dissent is more circumscribed and policed. But one factor that is different today is how far normalization with Israel, and the wider Abraham Accords project, becomes a fault line within Gulf societies. Public sympathy for Palestine remains strong, and this sits in tension with the efforts of Gulf rulers to deepen ties with Israel.