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    1. hoangson0403 on

      “This was where the field had been stuck for some time. Researchers before Adamala had figured out different ways to feed and grow synthetic cells and to replicate their DNA. But cell division is a different beast. A typical cell reorganizes its cytoskeleton — a network of protein fibers that provide structural support — to halve its DNA and split. Synthetic biologists could not figure out how to get their cells to undergo this complex process.

      So Adamala decided to ditch the cytoskeleton. One day, while tearing through the literature, she came across an interesting mechanism in a paper (opens a new tab). By attaching protein tags to a cell membrane, the synthetic biologist Reinhard Lipowsky (opens a new tab) at the Max Planck Institute of Colloids and Interfaces attracted other proteins to crowd around and physically bend the membrane, forcing the cell to divide. Following this approach, Adamala tweaked a cell-membrane protein and tested it in her protocells. After several tries, it worked.“

      This is the novel bit.

    2. “It’s a big step forward to this holy grail of making a living thing out of dead components”

      Super cool tech – but dude straight up sounds like Victor Frankenstein 😅

    3. garfieldsam on

      My best friend is an existential risk researcher so I have a much more pessimistic outlook on fundamental biology research than most people. 

      This is potentially terrifying as well as fascinating. The advent of CRISPR made the prospect of bad actors engineering mass death in their garage much higher than the layperson wants to know/admit. I don’t know the exact risk profile of this technology, but I imagine it brings us even closer to a world where anyone with the right resources can custom-engineer molecular life for any arbitrarily dangerous purpose.

      How close are we to engineering organisms that slip past existing pathogen screening programs (based on known DNA patterns)?

      How close are we to engineering dangerous organisms that can cause mass death without the traceability of other weapons of mass destruction like nuclear arms?

      How much easier will this make it for state actors to create pathogens that are more virulent, deadly, and persistent than existing diseases?

      How much easier will it be for someone to cause famine by engineering microbes that eat or sterilize staple crops like rice or economically critical animals like chickens en masse? Or a new invasive species that can destroy an entire ecosystem?

      How many new strategies are opened up for creating vaccine- or antibiotic-resistant pathogens?

      What kinds of political, regulatory, and other systems do we need to put in place *now* to mitigate these risks (as opposed to what we did with pandemic respiratory virus risk, which we just let balloon unaddressed until COVID bit us in the ass)?

      This stuff is cool and probably will have incredible medical applications but not enough people also ask the right questions about ex-risk when these technologies advance. 

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