Trump sollte sich vor der starken Partnerschaft zwischen seinen schärfsten Rivalen in Acht nehmen

Full article: When [Xi Jinping’s](https://inews.co.uk/topic/xi-jinping?srsltid=AfmBOopzrAVPL2IXeUs7ejd75rL7y4IazlFGzq40d2nIS2xX6nOIloYM&ico=in-line_link) plane touches down in Pyongyang this week, for his first visit to [North Korea](https://inews.co.uk/topic/north-korea?srsltid=AfmBOorZ6Z0Q1djwKTrTfIBHGKCcPWlEGZOgN-imN2FppWJaJ1zQ52nd&ico=in-line_link) in seven years, the image itself might feel like a subtle shift in the world’s balance.

As Washington publicly strains its alliances – most recently with Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth using a D-Day commemoration in Normandy to warn Europe of an [“invasion” of migrants](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c802e7jk458o), invoking rhetoric some of the watching dignitaries would once have associated only with the far-right fringe – an old authoritarian relationship may be finding renewed purpose.

For Beijing, this week’s visit is about something much larger than North Korea itself. [China](https://inews.co.uk/topic/china?srsltid=AfmBOorDJMVSEli1j99uq12n0foDfVk_jLHJh9LPlUexWXitVX4adaKO&ico=in-line_link) is increasingly seeking to present itself not simply as a great power, but as a predictable one: a safe pair of hands increasingly willing to cast itself as a stabilising force in a fragmenting world, too economically central to isolate and far too influential to ignore.

Xi wants to appear as the anti-Trump – steady where Washington looks volatile, disciplined where America appears distracted. And his message is aimed not just at longstanding partners unsettled by America’s direction, but strategic adversaries who might feel compelled to reassess not only their reliance on the US, but their assumptions about China itself.

[Trump](https://inews.co.uk/topic/donald-trump?srsltid=AfmBOoqaNnnqqX1o4dAIyEqQvF63o5b8E1GTYvGL83m768g0RZgJy93j&ico=in-line_link) will not be in the room in Pyongyang, of course. But fresh from his own [visit to Beijing,](https://inews.co.uk/news/world/trump-us-declining-nation-china-wont-take-over-4419990?ico=in-line_link) his shadow will loom heavily over it. The contrast is unavoidable. Xi, however, is unlikely to give his hosts the kind of discomfort Hegseth caused with his remarks in France last week.

The simplest reading of the China–North Korea relationship is of two authoritarian systems moving largely in lockstep, with Pyongyang often deferring to Beijing. China, after all, remains overwhelmingly North Korea’s most important economic partner, accounting for the vast majority of its international trade – and the two countries are bound by a mutual defence treaty, the only such agreement China maintains with another state.

But the long delay before this trip, a signal in itself, suggests something more complicated. After all, in the years since Xi last visited Pyongyang, he has travelled many times to countries where China’s relationships are defined as much by mistrust as cooperation.

That seven year gap points to problems for Xi to manage during this visit. For one, Beijing appears uneasy with North Korea’s status as a nuclear-armed state and its clear determination to expand those capabilities further. According to one estimate, North Korea has produced enough weapons-grade material for roughly ninety nuclear warheads.

Yet Pyongyang has made clear there will be no compromise. North Korea’s [nuclear weapons ](https://inews.co.uk/topic/nuclear-weapons?srsltid=AfmBOooSlbJ1ALtYkrBjf_BQdHVjNgK3pgyOpVlG-FgGXaOwY2EGsAP1&ico=in-line_link)programme is “absolutely non-negotiable”, according to a statement released by [Kim Jong Un’s](https://inews.co.uk/topic/kim-jong-un?srsltid=AfmBOop2_eOXhFgcjKj6jf-l5ZWBW9Wmyz98wkpvLFpn29IrqRvN45cX&ico=in-line_link) sister, Kim Yo Jong, on the eve of the meeting.

Although that message was presumably aimed at Washington more than Beijing, North Korea has never been comfortable marching entirely to another country’s beat – not even China’s. Like [Russia](https://inews.co.uk/topic/russia?srsltid=AfmBOoqLDdyRQa-zTACLwRbF379oYDOXXph-7Xwve5Lz_o4o3O6TikEV&ico=in-line_link), it increasingly sees the future as multipolar: a world no longer dominated by a single superpower, but shaped by competing centres of influence – where the steady dilution of American dominance will work to their own benefits.

For a small, isolated state like North Korea, nuclear weapons are central to that vision – an act of future proofing which gives Pyongyang leverage and strategic relevance far beyond its economic weight.

In moving beyond the simple focus of extracting concessions from Washington, Kim has aligned more openly with both China and Russia since the first Trump presidency, when the American president dismissed him as “little rocket man”. Once seen only as the youthful leader of a pariah state, Kim can now speak with outsized confidence as part of an emerging bloc led by China and reinforced by Moscow. And like Xi, he may see Trump’s disruption of alliances and international norms not as a threat, but as evidence that the world is already moving in his direction.

One of the less clear questions is the timing. What, if anything, is the significance of this visit coming only weeks after Trump’s summit with Xi?

One theory is that China now sees an opportunity to position itself as a mediator between Washington and Pyongyang, reasserting its value as an indispensable interlocutor at a moment of heightened uncertainty. But there may also be a simpler, less Trump-centric explanation.

According to one tally, Xi has already hosted well over a dozen world leaders in Beijing this year, including Vladimir Putin, who arrived shortly after the American president’s own visit. In 2026, Beijing has been able to present itself as the world’s diplomatic capital: a place where rivals, partners and uneasy allies continue to arrive, even as Washington’s relationships with many of them grow more strained.

Viewed through that lens, the proximity of Trump’s visit may reflect not urgency on Xi’s part, but confidence.

For him, perhaps, the American president’s visit was not the diplomatic centrepiece, but just another world leader making the journey to Beijing – another moment in the story of the Chinese century.