Kommentar des Kommandeurs des 1. Armeekorps der Nationalgarde „Asow“ Denys Prokopenko: Wir kämpfen gegen Russland und wissen, warum es verliert

## We Are Fighting Russia, and We Know Why It Is Losing

**May 27, 08:30**
**8–11 minutes**

On the eve of the full-scale invasion in 2022, Western think tanks and intelligence communities made a fundamental mistake in assessing Russian military power.

Their forecasts, which predicted the fall of Kyiv within a matter of days, were based on quantitative indicators: a million-strong army, thousands of aircraft, tanks, and artillery systems. This approach frightened ordinary readers, but it ignored intangible yet decisive factors: command culture, morale, social cohesion, and the ability to adapt.

Analysts misinterpreted both Putin’s tolerance for risk and the isolation of the decision-making process in the Kremlin, which led to flawed predictions about possible escalation and Russia’s reaction to NATO support for Ukraine.

This analytical blindness partly persists even now. Many in the West continue to view this conflict purely through the lens of a war of attrition, where victory is determined solely by the volume of resources and the ability to mobilize more people. This is a dangerous mistake.

This war is not simply a clash of armies, but the ultimate test of two diametrically opposed systems that emerged in the post-Soviet space. One system, the Ukrainian one, is a networked model built on trust, one that unleashes human potential. A large share of the changes here have been initiated and developed by ordinary citizens, soldiers, sergeants, and junior officers. This includes the transition of the Ukrainian Defense Forces to a corps system, which was promoted by Azov as a necessary step.

The Ukrainian Defense Forces, especially in units that grew out of the volunteer movement, such as Azov, have cultivated a command philosophy based on the principles of decentralization and empowerment.

This model is a modern interpretation of the German concept of **Auftragstaktik**, or mission command, which was developed for conducting combat operations on a dynamic, nonlinear battlefield.

The essence of this approach is that higher command defines the objective of the operation and the desired end result — the “what” and the “why” — that is, it formulates the commander’s intent. After that, commanders of subordinate units develop decisions for approval, either in coordination with the commander or independently. In other words, the “how” of achieving the goal is left to the discretion of commanders on the ground, who have the most up-to-date understanding of the battlefield situation.

After further adjustment or final approval of the decision, actions/the operation begin. This approach requires a high level of trust and coordination among all levels of command. It creates an environment of high trust, where initiative is not merely encouraged but forms the basis of combat effectiveness. A unit becomes a single organism, a “family” or “team,” where everyone feels involved in and responsible for carrying out the assigned task.

This principle is not an informal practice; it is embedded in combat regulations, which emphasize decisiveness, surprise, and the exercise of initiative in order to complete combat missions under difficult conditions against superior enemy forces.

A striking example of this is what the Defense Forces did in the Dobropillia direction in the second half of 2025 — essentially a rethinking of the concept of mobile defense under conditions of modern warfare. A huge gray zone, a kill zone stretching up to 20 km from the line of combat contact, mixed battle formations, ambushes, search-and-strike actions, fire raids, precise surgical counterattacks, encirclement of Russian units, and hundreds of enemy prisoners.

The Russian military command system is the direct opposite. It is a rigid, vertically integrated hierarchy of the Soviet type, where every step is regulated from above. This system was created not for maximum combat effectiveness, but to ensure political control over the army, where loyalty to the regime has always been more important than competence. As a result, such a structure leads to operational paralysis on the modern battlefield.

The key evidence of this systemic flaw is the chronic underdevelopment of junior command personnel and the madness of senior officers who are prepared to sacrifice enormous numbers of personnel — literally down to the last soldier — in order to please leadership, without deviating even one step from the intent of a superior commander, even if that intent was doomed to failure from the very beginning. This demonstrates a lack of flexibility in decision-making and a fear of taking responsibility within the system, lest things become even worse.

In March, we marked the first anniversary of the creation of the 1st Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine, “Azov.” In a short period of time, the corps’ command and headquarters were formed from combat officers with many years of military experience, who had taken part in battles back in 2014–2015 while serving in private and sergeant positions.

The overwhelming majority of them have gone through every level of command: having served in command and staff positions, they have taken responsibility upon themselves and know the war well from the trenches.

**1.** With the assistance of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Syrskyi, a full complement of corps troops was assembled, making it possible to conduct a full-fledged defensive operation. All brigades are holding the defense in the corps’ designated sector and carrying out combat missions side by side at the proper level.

The problem of coordination between brigades at junctions has disappeared, preventing the enemy from breaking through the main defensive line at weak points and developing success by entering operational space.

Combat and specialized training conducted by instructors according to “Azov standards” is bearing fruit:

* the level of training during basic combined-arms training has increased;
* instructor-methodological classes are being conducted with junior commanders and specialists;
* command-staff exercises are being conducted with officers of command/staff elements.

This is clearly reflected in the motivation of those being trained and in the quality with which assigned combat missions are carried out.

**2.** Attached units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard of Ukraine, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, and the National Police are carrying out combat tasks on the same level as regular corps units and have become an integral part of the corps. They are adopting combat experience, receiving proper support, and conducting joint classes and training.

**3.** In the summer of 2025, the enemy concentrated its main effort in the Dobropillia direction, where it managed to break through the front along a width of 15 km and to a depth of up to 20 km.

In cooperation with the Defense Forces, the enemy’s advance was stopped, counteroffensive actions to restore lost positions were successfully carried out, and the stability of the defense was ensured.

**4.** On my initiative, the corps’ sector is gradually being expanded in order to strengthen the flanks, cover attacked sections of the front, and increase the stability of the defense where necessary. This makes it possible to free up units of neighboring corps and restore them.

**5.** With properly structured work by corps-level command, there are no problems in coordination with units of the Unmanned Systems Forces, the Air Assault Forces, and assault troops.

**6.** New organic units have been created:

* the 8th Separate Artillery Brigade “Harmash”;
* the 41st Unmanned Systems Regiment “Pilum”;
* the Separate Special Purpose Regiment “Tuman”;
* rear support units — material and technical support battalion, automobile battalion, repair and recovery battalion;
* the 14th Assault Regiment, currently being formed;
* the Support Forces Regiment, currently being formed;
* the Medical Battalion, currently being formed.

**7.** We have covered the tactical-operational and operational depth: reconnaissance, strikes, mining. Enemy equipment, depots, forward positions/points, and other targets are burning at depths of up to 250 km.

**8.** Medical service and support:

* a procedure has been introduced for delivering blood to the front line by drones;
* battlefield evacuation is being conducted using unmanned ground systems;
* cooperation has been ongoing throughout the year with leading medical institutions of Ukraine;
* full compliance with international protocols;
* work is underway on a large-scale project for the rehabilitation and support of those released from captivity.

**9.** We are developing corps infrastructure: training grounds, schools, laboratories, workshops, production facilities, warehouses, and so on.

**10.** Corps intelligence, international cooperation, training units, the school of **khorunzhyi** officers, and many other initiatives are aimed at scaling up Azov’s values, strengthening the state’s defense capability, and developing effective methods of command.

**11.** Western partners are learning from us and willingly adopting our combat experience.

The Battle for Donbas is in full swing! We continue to work, strike the enemy, and fight for the return of our prisoners.

**Glory to Ukraine!**

**Denys Prokopenko**

This column is a type of material that reflects solely the author’s point of view. It does not claim to provide an objective or comprehensive treatment of the topic discussed. The editorial position of *Ekonomichna Pravda* and *Ukrainska Pravda* may not coincide with the author’s point of view. The editorial office is not responsible for the accuracy or interpretation of the information provided and acts solely as a publisher.