> **Unshared patents, disputed markets, impossible governance: Dassault and Airbus have sunk the largest European military program after nine years of industrial war.**
> On April 22, 2026, Eric Trappier announced the end of negotiations between Dassault Aviation and Airbus Defence & Space on the New Generation Fighter (NGF), a central pillar of the FCAS program. Three weeks earlier, Berlin had appointed two last chance mediators: Laurent Collet-Billon, former boss of the Directorate-General for Armaments, on the French side; Franck Haun, former CEO of KNDS, on the German side. They had until April 18 to deliver their conclusions, before obtaining an additional ten days. Result: two separate reports. That of the German mediator concluded that it was impossible to build a common Franco-German combat aircraft. Two days later, Emmanuel Macron said from Cyprus that the FCAS was „not dead at all“ and gave „a mandate to our defense ministries to work on several axes“. No axis was designated. The most ambitious program ever committed in Europe, estimated at nearly 100 billion euros, had just lost its heart.
> *A program born on an industrial misunderstanding*
> When Macron and Merkel launched the FCAS on July 13, 2017, the interests of the two main manufacturers concerned did not really intersect. Dassault is looking for opportunities. The Rafale was then only sold to the French army, after years of aborted export attempts. The FCAS represents an industrial perspective and European legitimacy. Airbus Defence & Space, for its part, does not have a new generation manned fighter. The program is for the defense subsidiary of the European group a gateway to a market that Dassault dominates alone.
> The program is structured according to the principle of the „best athlete“: Dassault takes the leadership of the NGF, Airbus inherits the companion drones, the Remote Carriers, and the interconnected digital combat cloud. The distribution seems logical. It is actually shaky: Dassault finds himself master of the aircraft pillar without being able to impose his arbitrations on Airbus Germany and Airbus Spain, each weighing on the governance of the program. No binding arbitration mechanism was included in the founding texts. The marriage is signed without a marriage contract.
> *Three countries, three planes under the same acronym*
> The three states did not further harmonize their operational needs before signing. France requires a device compatible with airborne nuclear deterrence and with the future New Generation Aircraft Carrier: reinforced landing gear to take into the landing shocks, stop butt, catapults. These constraints dictate non-negotiable design choices and prohibit any reliance on critical functions. Germany has neither aircraft carrier nor national nuclear deterrence. It is looking for a NATO multi-role aircraft, complementary to the F-35A already ordered to ensure nuclear sharing with Washington.
> Chancellor Friedrich Merz summarized the incompatibility bluntly on February 18, 2026, in the Machtwechsel podcast: „The French need an aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons and operating from an aircraft carrier. This is not what we need right now in the German army. Spain, which joined the program in February 2019 at the request of Berlin, pursued a more modest objective: securing industrial skills via Indra and ITP Aero. Three countries had engaged on three different aircraft under the same acronym.
> *The patent war*
> Negotiations hang for the first time on intellectual property in 2019. They won’t get over it. Dassault refuses to transfer the technologies inherited from the Rafale, flight controls, embedded software, stealth architectures, in a framework where he would not control their use. These technologies have taken decades to develop. Above all, they condition export contracts in markets where Airbus Defence & Space is a direct competitor: India, the Emirates, Qatar, Greece. Sharing their intellectual property within the framework of the FCAS is tantamount to arming a rival on the same calls for tenders.
> Berlin, for its part, frames the intellectual property of the programs it finances according to a national legal framework incompatible with the French conception of technological sovereignty. A report by the German Ministry of Defense, quoted by Reuters in the summer of 2025, is unambiguous: „French industry prevents the progress of the project by asking to ensure its management. German industrial sources advance a French claim of 80% participation in the program. Emmanuel Chiva, then General Delegate for armaments, rectifies before Parliament: Dassault does not demand 80%, but 51% of the workload, to really exercise his role as a project manager and choose his subcontractors. Two figures, two readings of the same disagreement, two opposing visions of technological control.
> *The Rafale sold out, and the balance of power has changed*
> Between 2017 and 2026, India, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Greece, Egypt, Croatia and Indonesia order Rafale. Dassault is becoming an autonomous and credible export player, precisely in the markets where Airbus Defence & Space sometimes operates as a competitor. The need for European legitimacy that the FCAS had to bring has dissolved in the order books.
> Trappier publicly mentions a cost of less than 50 billion euros to develop the NGF alone, according to remarks reported by Reuters. The Rafale F5, a transition standard planned from 2030 and integrating a stealth combat drone derived from the nEUROn demonstrator, has already been under contract since 2024. In industrial circles, it is seen as a credible alternative to Franco-German cooperation. In 2017, Dassault needed the FCAS. In 2026, Trappier has another option, quantified.
> The situation of Airbus Defence & Space is reversed. The subsidiary has built its place in European combat aviation on the pillars of drones, combat cloud and motorization, the latter via the joint venture EUMET, created on a parity by Safran and MTU Aero Engines with Spanish ITP Aero as a partner, under German law and based in Munich. Losing leadership on the manned aircraft weakens the entire building. No equivalent concession is possible on both sides.
> *The rupture, declared long before it was announced*
> The war of public statements begins in the summer of 2025 and will not stop. In July, Trappier said: „To be effective, you need a real leader. » The formula directly targets the shared governance of the program. In August, Michael Schoellhorn, CEO of Airbus Defence & Space, responded in the German specialized letter Griephan Briefe that there is „no longer any reason to sue“ the FCAS except a return to the agreed governance principles. In October, Guillaume Faury, CEO of Airbus, indicated that if Dassault „is not satisfied“ with the framework, he is „free to leave the program“. In December, on France Inter, he denounced a Dassault management that practices the method „it’s my conditions or nothing“.
> On November 26, 2025, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, Senator Hugues Saury reported that Dassault reproached the German subsidiary of Airbus for not having „been able to carry out the technical sub-assemblies for which it was responsible“, which „contributed to the deterioration of relations between the design offices“. Two series of grievances made public simultaneously, through different channels, for months. The break of April 22, 2026 had been pronounced long before it was announced.
> Faced with the divergence of needs, Berlin had advanced the idea of two separate NGFs sharing a minimum common denominator. Merz himself asked the question in Machtwechsel: „Do we have the strength and the will to build two aircraft for these two different requirements, or only one? The question remained unanswered.
Youare-Beautiful3329 on
It’s dead, Jim. What a bloody mess.
NeedleGunMonkey on
The mistake is always wanting to do joint programs with the French industries and national interests. The same independence streak that leads France to have its own nuclear program, independent nuclear powered submarines, SSBNs and other capabilities – is also why joint programs with the French don’t work.
Better off being a customer.
mschuster91 on
> It is actually shaky: Dassault finds himself master of the aircraft pillar without being able to impose his arbitrations on Airbus
Yeah. That’s what the French always want: they want the control and they want the rest of Europe to be the paypigs for all of it. No thanks, it’s high time for this BS to end, it’s already cost us MGCS and it made the life of EADS/Airbus/Eurofighter much more complex than it needed to be.
France, grow the fuck up, you aren’t an empire any more, no matter your delusions of grandeur.
Everyone else, meanwhile, can join up forces with us Germans, we’re always open to productive decisions and reasonable agreements.
Haunting-Detail2025 on
Then this sub will act bewildered when countries order the F-35
isaacladboy on
Loosing ship orders, risking loosing aircraft orders and now multiple next gen equipment is falling under. The French arms industry really is a mess
3000doorsofportugal on
Why in the fuck is anyone shocked? You take the two nations most known for being hard to work with in Aerospace and put them together. This was only ever gonna end one way.
Erki82 on
So Airbus and Saab teamup coming next possibly.
diamanthaende on
Still waiting for an official statement, but let me just add a German saying:
*Lieber ein Ende mit Schrecken als ein Schrecken ohne Ende*.
TokioHot on
Surprisingly unsurprised.
ObviouslyTriggered on
**F**rench **C**an’t **A**ctually **S**hare
zain_monti on
*British laugh intensifies*
marutotigre on
Guess the same will happen to the next gen tank then? Way I saw it, the frenchs led the fighter program and the germans the tank one. The airplane one dies, I assume France won’t be so willing to just have a german led project.
marutotigre on
If the article speaks true, I can’t fault Dassault. The airplane being made for French needs, while also responding to general usage (the assumed requirements for Germany), is just sensible. I understand the Germans don’t want the ‚extra costs‘ of having a nuclear and carrier capable fighter, but if the goal is to be independent of the US, then such a plane is needed.
Lebowski304 on
I can see how a conflict of interest might develop if a company is being asked to share its IP and trade secrets with a rival who will then use it to compete in a different market. I have no dog in the fight, but that seems like a pretty legitimate concern. I would say something about a unified EU command being a solution, but this seems like the kinda thing that would happen regardless because of the corporate aspect.
Spacecruiser96 on
So is this a Rafale/Eurofighter drama all over again?
colintbowers on
Two obvious takeaways from that article:
1) Two different planes were needed by two different countries.
2) A single company needed to be responsible for providing them.
On that second point, it could have been a single company in which both Dassault and Airbus were shareholders, but it needed to be a separate legal entity to both of them.
VikingsOfTomorrow on
So, from what I can see…
It was an ambitious project, started without clearing up what the base requirements for it are, and built up without any systems to resolve conflicts that may arise during development. yeah, im not surprised this failed.
Oh, and all this largely because of the F-35, which is by now about as trustworthy as the Su-57. At least the Su-57 would have braindead easy maintenance….. amazing.
akkari1990 on
Ahh so the „Sicherheitshalber“ podcast is able to retire now.
(/s pls don’t ever retire the podcast)
Any-Original-6113 on
Will Germany-Spain develop their own fighter, or will they buy fighter from the UK-Italy-Japan programme?
swainiscadianreborn on
So Germany will buy the F-35 (maybe they’ll wait for the GCAP to conclude but I doubt so) and France will build a sort of Super Rafale.
As was always meant to happen. I am though cyrious about the future of the tank program. I prophetized years ago that Germany will somehow fuck it up in a similar way and France would have to either buy German tanks or keep the Leclerc for 10 more years.
Unusual-Fault-4091 on
Time for a SaaBus.
Aunvilgod on
can we finally go ahead with spain and sweden now
KhalaadDruun on
It’s been dead since day1 and you cannot really blame Dassault or Airbus for it.
You need to meet 3 conditions for such an extensive cooperation to succeed :
– common operational need: never existed. France needs to cover nuclear deterrence and navalization. Germany wants a big bird.
– industrial synergy : France view was based on best athlete. The one who know do/lead, in order to minimize costs. Germany and Spain view is to use the project to build up new know-how. Neither approach is good or bad but you need to choose and whereas the question was on table on day1, the answer never came as politicians cowardly let their industries fighting each other to win this fight, only leading to stalemate and miserably ineffective comprimises.
Media’s narratives try to tell us black and white stories, but as a shareholder of Dassault or Airbus, destroying value is not an option.
– political commitment: on one side the project IS a pure political item that has benefited from cont’d support along the last decade. However, it is fair to say that the tough issues have never been properly adressed at the right level, except at the very end where both parties finally discovered after 10 years that there was no room for an agreement – that could have been treated from day 1 but our leadership prefered to nagivate through ambiguity.
Unfortunately, one cannot build a 100bn€ system with ambiguity. As a taxpayer I cannot blame that one stops something that should never had begun…
BazsiHHH on
Great good job who would have tought ffs
Visual_Ingenuity3258 on
At some point the Ukrainians will develop something better anyway.
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27 Kommentare
what the actual f
i guess it’s time to get into SAAB stock full on
> **Unshared patents, disputed markets, impossible governance: Dassault and Airbus have sunk the largest European military program after nine years of industrial war.**
> On April 22, 2026, Eric Trappier announced the end of negotiations between Dassault Aviation and Airbus Defence & Space on the New Generation Fighter (NGF), a central pillar of the FCAS program. Three weeks earlier, Berlin had appointed two last chance mediators: Laurent Collet-Billon, former boss of the Directorate-General for Armaments, on the French side; Franck Haun, former CEO of KNDS, on the German side. They had until April 18 to deliver their conclusions, before obtaining an additional ten days. Result: two separate reports. That of the German mediator concluded that it was impossible to build a common Franco-German combat aircraft. Two days later, Emmanuel Macron said from Cyprus that the FCAS was „not dead at all“ and gave „a mandate to our defense ministries to work on several axes“. No axis was designated. The most ambitious program ever committed in Europe, estimated at nearly 100 billion euros, had just lost its heart.
> *A program born on an industrial misunderstanding*
> When Macron and Merkel launched the FCAS on July 13, 2017, the interests of the two main manufacturers concerned did not really intersect. Dassault is looking for opportunities. The Rafale was then only sold to the French army, after years of aborted export attempts. The FCAS represents an industrial perspective and European legitimacy. Airbus Defence & Space, for its part, does not have a new generation manned fighter. The program is for the defense subsidiary of the European group a gateway to a market that Dassault dominates alone.
> The program is structured according to the principle of the „best athlete“: Dassault takes the leadership of the NGF, Airbus inherits the companion drones, the Remote Carriers, and the interconnected digital combat cloud. The distribution seems logical. It is actually shaky: Dassault finds himself master of the aircraft pillar without being able to impose his arbitrations on Airbus Germany and Airbus Spain, each weighing on the governance of the program. No binding arbitration mechanism was included in the founding texts. The marriage is signed without a marriage contract.
> *Three countries, three planes under the same acronym*
> The three states did not further harmonize their operational needs before signing. France requires a device compatible with airborne nuclear deterrence and with the future New Generation Aircraft Carrier: reinforced landing gear to take into the landing shocks, stop butt, catapults. These constraints dictate non-negotiable design choices and prohibit any reliance on critical functions. Germany has neither aircraft carrier nor national nuclear deterrence. It is looking for a NATO multi-role aircraft, complementary to the F-35A already ordered to ensure nuclear sharing with Washington.
> Chancellor Friedrich Merz summarized the incompatibility bluntly on February 18, 2026, in the Machtwechsel podcast: „The French need an aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons and operating from an aircraft carrier. This is not what we need right now in the German army. Spain, which joined the program in February 2019 at the request of Berlin, pursued a more modest objective: securing industrial skills via Indra and ITP Aero. Three countries had engaged on three different aircraft under the same acronym.
> *The patent war*
> Negotiations hang for the first time on intellectual property in 2019. They won’t get over it. Dassault refuses to transfer the technologies inherited from the Rafale, flight controls, embedded software, stealth architectures, in a framework where he would not control their use. These technologies have taken decades to develop. Above all, they condition export contracts in markets where Airbus Defence & Space is a direct competitor: India, the Emirates, Qatar, Greece. Sharing their intellectual property within the framework of the FCAS is tantamount to arming a rival on the same calls for tenders.
> Berlin, for its part, frames the intellectual property of the programs it finances according to a national legal framework incompatible with the French conception of technological sovereignty. A report by the German Ministry of Defense, quoted by Reuters in the summer of 2025, is unambiguous: „French industry prevents the progress of the project by asking to ensure its management. German industrial sources advance a French claim of 80% participation in the program. Emmanuel Chiva, then General Delegate for armaments, rectifies before Parliament: Dassault does not demand 80%, but 51% of the workload, to really exercise his role as a project manager and choose his subcontractors. Two figures, two readings of the same disagreement, two opposing visions of technological control.
> *The Rafale sold out, and the balance of power has changed*
> Between 2017 and 2026, India, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Greece, Egypt, Croatia and Indonesia order Rafale. Dassault is becoming an autonomous and credible export player, precisely in the markets where Airbus Defence & Space sometimes operates as a competitor. The need for European legitimacy that the FCAS had to bring has dissolved in the order books.
> Trappier publicly mentions a cost of less than 50 billion euros to develop the NGF alone, according to remarks reported by Reuters. The Rafale F5, a transition standard planned from 2030 and integrating a stealth combat drone derived from the nEUROn demonstrator, has already been under contract since 2024. In industrial circles, it is seen as a credible alternative to Franco-German cooperation. In 2017, Dassault needed the FCAS. In 2026, Trappier has another option, quantified.
> The situation of Airbus Defence & Space is reversed. The subsidiary has built its place in European combat aviation on the pillars of drones, combat cloud and motorization, the latter via the joint venture EUMET, created on a parity by Safran and MTU Aero Engines with Spanish ITP Aero as a partner, under German law and based in Munich. Losing leadership on the manned aircraft weakens the entire building. No equivalent concession is possible on both sides.
> *The rupture, declared long before it was announced*
> The war of public statements begins in the summer of 2025 and will not stop. In July, Trappier said: „To be effective, you need a real leader. » The formula directly targets the shared governance of the program. In August, Michael Schoellhorn, CEO of Airbus Defence & Space, responded in the German specialized letter Griephan Briefe that there is „no longer any reason to sue“ the FCAS except a return to the agreed governance principles. In October, Guillaume Faury, CEO of Airbus, indicated that if Dassault „is not satisfied“ with the framework, he is „free to leave the program“. In December, on France Inter, he denounced a Dassault management that practices the method „it’s my conditions or nothing“.
> On November 26, 2025, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, Senator Hugues Saury reported that Dassault reproached the German subsidiary of Airbus for not having „been able to carry out the technical sub-assemblies for which it was responsible“, which „contributed to the deterioration of relations between the design offices“. Two series of grievances made public simultaneously, through different channels, for months. The break of April 22, 2026 had been pronounced long before it was announced.
> Faced with the divergence of needs, Berlin had advanced the idea of two separate NGFs sharing a minimum common denominator. Merz himself asked the question in Machtwechsel: „Do we have the strength and the will to build two aircraft for these two different requirements, or only one? The question remained unanswered.
It’s dead, Jim. What a bloody mess.
The mistake is always wanting to do joint programs with the French industries and national interests. The same independence streak that leads France to have its own nuclear program, independent nuclear powered submarines, SSBNs and other capabilities – is also why joint programs with the French don’t work.
Better off being a customer.
> It is actually shaky: Dassault finds himself master of the aircraft pillar without being able to impose his arbitrations on Airbus
Yeah. That’s what the French always want: they want the control and they want the rest of Europe to be the paypigs for all of it. No thanks, it’s high time for this BS to end, it’s already cost us MGCS and it made the life of EADS/Airbus/Eurofighter much more complex than it needed to be.
France, grow the fuck up, you aren’t an empire any more, no matter your delusions of grandeur.
Everyone else, meanwhile, can join up forces with us Germans, we’re always open to productive decisions and reasonable agreements.
Then this sub will act bewildered when countries order the F-35
Loosing ship orders, risking loosing aircraft orders and now multiple next gen equipment is falling under. The French arms industry really is a mess
Why in the fuck is anyone shocked? You take the two nations most known for being hard to work with in Aerospace and put them together. This was only ever gonna end one way.
So Airbus and Saab teamup coming next possibly.
Still waiting for an official statement, but let me just add a German saying:
*Lieber ein Ende mit Schrecken als ein Schrecken ohne Ende*.
Surprisingly unsurprised.
**F**rench **C**an’t **A**ctually **S**hare
*British laugh intensifies*
Guess the same will happen to the next gen tank then? Way I saw it, the frenchs led the fighter program and the germans the tank one. The airplane one dies, I assume France won’t be so willing to just have a german led project.
If the article speaks true, I can’t fault Dassault. The airplane being made for French needs, while also responding to general usage (the assumed requirements for Germany), is just sensible. I understand the Germans don’t want the ‚extra costs‘ of having a nuclear and carrier capable fighter, but if the goal is to be independent of the US, then such a plane is needed.
I can see how a conflict of interest might develop if a company is being asked to share its IP and trade secrets with a rival who will then use it to compete in a different market. I have no dog in the fight, but that seems like a pretty legitimate concern. I would say something about a unified EU command being a solution, but this seems like the kinda thing that would happen regardless because of the corporate aspect.
So is this a Rafale/Eurofighter drama all over again?
Two obvious takeaways from that article:
1) Two different planes were needed by two different countries.
2) A single company needed to be responsible for providing them.
On that second point, it could have been a single company in which both Dassault and Airbus were shareholders, but it needed to be a separate legal entity to both of them.
So, from what I can see…
It was an ambitious project, started without clearing up what the base requirements for it are, and built up without any systems to resolve conflicts that may arise during development. yeah, im not surprised this failed.
Oh, and all this largely because of the F-35, which is by now about as trustworthy as the Su-57. At least the Su-57 would have braindead easy maintenance….. amazing.
Ahh so the „Sicherheitshalber“ podcast is able to retire now.
(/s pls don’t ever retire the podcast)
Will Germany-Spain develop their own fighter, or will they buy fighter from the UK-Italy-Japan programme?
So Germany will buy the F-35 (maybe they’ll wait for the GCAP to conclude but I doubt so) and France will build a sort of Super Rafale.
As was always meant to happen. I am though cyrious about the future of the tank program. I prophetized years ago that Germany will somehow fuck it up in a similar way and France would have to either buy German tanks or keep the Leclerc for 10 more years.
Time for a SaaBus.
can we finally go ahead with spain and sweden now
It’s been dead since day1 and you cannot really blame Dassault or Airbus for it.
You need to meet 3 conditions for such an extensive cooperation to succeed :
– common operational need: never existed. France needs to cover nuclear deterrence and navalization. Germany wants a big bird.
– industrial synergy : France view was based on best athlete. The one who know do/lead, in order to minimize costs. Germany and Spain view is to use the project to build up new know-how. Neither approach is good or bad but you need to choose and whereas the question was on table on day1, the answer never came as politicians cowardly let their industries fighting each other to win this fight, only leading to stalemate and miserably ineffective comprimises.
Media’s narratives try to tell us black and white stories, but as a shareholder of Dassault or Airbus, destroying value is not an option.
– political commitment: on one side the project IS a pure political item that has benefited from cont’d support along the last decade. However, it is fair to say that the tough issues have never been properly adressed at the right level, except at the very end where both parties finally discovered after 10 years that there was no room for an agreement – that could have been treated from day 1 but our leadership prefered to nagivate through ambiguity.
Unfortunately, one cannot build a 100bn€ system with ambiguity. As a taxpayer I cannot blame that one stops something that should never had begun…
Great good job who would have tought ffs
At some point the Ukrainians will develop something better anyway.