„Die Situation wurde unkontrollierbar“: Der Kommandeur der 54. Separaten Mechanisierten Brigade der AFU, Oberst Vadym Cherniy, über die Gründe, warum Siwersk „auseinanderfiel“, Probleme auf der Kontaktlinie in der Nähe von Slowjansk und mehr

**Translation:**

**1/2**

**Vadym Cherniy**

Colonel, commander of the 54th Separate Mechanized Brigade named after Hetman Ivan Mazepa. He was appointed to the position in January 2026 after the Defence Forces lost control of Siversk in Donetsk region. Prior to that, for four years, he served as commander of the 2nd Mechanized Battalion of the 28th Mechanized Brigade named after the Knights of the Winter Campaign.

*Siversk in Donetsk region was “stable” until it was completely lost within a matter of weeks. The previous command concealed the loss of positions and demonstrated military impotence on the line of contact. Eventually, false reporting and reliance on drones led to losses. Today, this is also affecting the Sloviansk direction.*

*In an interview with the media outlet “Vchasno”, the commander of the 54th Mechanized Brigade Vadym Cherniy, who took command of the brigade in January 2026 after the events in Siversk, speaks about the situation inside the formation then and now, and about the “loose ends” that adjacent units shifted onto his unit. In addition, he explains why close combat of his infantry is a positive development, rather than a failure of command or incompetence in decision-making.*

# How Siversk “fell”: in early December the city was lost unofficially, and by the end of the month — officially

In mid-November 2025, the defensive line near Siversk entered a critical situation: military observers raised alarms that the enemy had broken through what was then one of the strongest and longest front lines in Donetsk region held by Ukraine.

On November 19, analysts stated that Russian forces had captured 20% of Siversk. This contradicted official statements from the 11th Army Corps and the brigades defending the Siversk sector at the time — the 54th Mechanized Brigade, the 81st Air Assault Brigade, and the 10th Mountain Assault Brigade. At that moment, Russian forces already controlled logistics routes around the city, but spokesperson of the 11th Army Corps Dmytro Zaporozhets still stated on December 11 that such reports were untrue. The press service of the 54th Brigade also published footage of repelled assaults, claiming that “the brigade is holding a strong defense and withdrawal from the city is not planned.”

In reality, at that time the defense of Siversk was already collapsing at a catastrophic pace: positions on the axis were being abandoned without authorization by dozens of servicemen from all three brigades holding the line. Some positions became isolated because soldiers there did not realize that neighboring positions were already empty. As a result, enemy troops were later detected in those “gaps,” sometimes penetrating deep into the rear, which Ukrainian forces had not expected.

Officially, the 11th Corps confirmed the loss of Siversk only on December 24, stating: “We were forced to withdraw.” At that time, the 54th Brigade’s press service explained the withdrawal by heavy use of guided bombs (KABs) and about 1,500 Russian troops who had entrenched themselves in the city. Ukrainian forces pulled back to elevated positions outside Siversk to avoid encirclement.

The blame was initially placed on soldiers of the 54th Brigade — claims suggested they abandoned positions. However, later information indicated that adjacent units had already failed to cover their flanks, leaving the brigade’s infantry effectively operating in a “wedge.” Eventually, the depleted brigade also conducted an unauthorized withdrawal, which brought wider attention to the problem: command had been concealing the real situation in Siversk for months. The then commander of the 54th Brigade, Oleksii Konoval, was removed from his post, and he was rapidly replaced by 30-year-old Vadym “Nesquik” Cherniy, who had previously been a battalion commander in the 28th Separate Brigade.

However, Cherniy did not become a “magic fix” — the sector remains highly tense and unstable to this day.

# Firefighting by appointing a new commander — the brigade was “gifted” within 5 days

**— The appointment of a young battalion commander as the commander of a brigade that had just lost its defensive line in Siversk became a high-profile decision by the Commander-in-Chief. At that moment, the unit was depleted and battered, and the choice of someone from outside the brigade was quite unexpected. Before your appointment, were you in any way connected to the 54th Mechanized Brigade?**

— No. It was new to me, but I knew about it. At one time, the 54th was one of the newly formed brigades, so in 2016–2017 service there was not a priority.

**— How much time passed from the day you were offered to head the 54th Brigade to the moment you took command?**

— I took command of the brigade in a very short time — 5 days. And this affects the effectiveness of employing the brigade on the battlefield, because at least 2–3 months are needed to understand all the problems in a unit. The appointment happened on my birthday. So, I was essentially “gifted” a military unit of the Armed Forces.

**On the situation on the critical Donetsk axis (now a new one, Sloviansk direction)**

**— During those five days when you were taking up the post and getting acquainted, did you understand what was happening with the 54th Brigade? There was a lot of attention around the 81st, the 10th, and the 54th brigades, including reports that the defense had collapsed.**

— My first impressions of the brigade were negative. First of all, I thought it was a drone unit rather than a mechanized one. But later I familiarized myself with the situation and put together almost the full picture. The situation in terms of relations between adjacent units has improved now.

In terms of combat operations, I still have some problems. But my conscience is clear: legally I am fulfilling my duties, raising problematic issues. At times they gain momentum. I report the situation, request assistance from higher command, and then the decision is theirs.

**— At the time you took the position, were the causes of the loss of Siversk the result of decisions made by previous unit leadership?**

— Yes, it was a combination of negligence, irresponsibility, lack of control, and cronyism at all levels. This set of factors accumulated over a year to a year and a half of combat operations. As a result, the situation became uncontrollable, which led to the loss of Siversk.

Thanks for the article and translation. I am impressed that Ukraine is willing to discuss the truth, even when it is embarrassing.