Die echte Thukydides-Falle: Wie Selbstüberschätzung Amerika und China in einen Krieg verwickeln könnte

[Excerpt from essay by Joshua Rovner, Associate Professor of International Relations at American University, Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and author of *Strategy and Grand Strategy*.]

Even as a political crisis deepened and diplomacy broke down, Athens and Sparta each understood the nature of its rival’s comparative advantage, but both still imagined they could win a war quickly. When fighting broke out and these hopes were exposed as illusions, the great powers found themselves mired in a long and ruinous war. This was the real Thucydides trap.

There are worrying signs that China and the United States are heading in the same direction today. Like Sparta and Athens, Beijing and Washington each hold a comparative advantage. China is the preeminent land power in East Asia, and the United States is the strongest at sea. The enormous Chinese mainland is a reliable refuge for Chinese forces, and whereas analysts debate China’s ability to execute joint amphibious operations, no one really questions its ability to defend on land. The United States, meanwhile, is unique in its ability to project naval power; it can operate effectively across vast maritime distances. Yet although each country is wealthy and capable, neither has an obvious way of dealing with its adversary’s main forces, concentrated as they are in different domains. And if China retains its dominance on land or the United States retains its dominance at sea, neither would be easily compelled to surrender. In theory, that unresolved strategic dilemma should discourage both great powers from direct hostilities.