Ein japanischer SDF-Offizier erfuhr während seines Studiums in Harvard von Chinas „Honeypot“-Spionagefallen. Dann tauchte eine schöne junge Chinesin in seinem eigenen Privatbüro auf.
Ein japanischer SDF-Offizier erfuhr während seines Studiums in Harvard von Chinas „Honeypot“-Spionagefallen. Dann tauchte eine schöne junge Chinesin in seinem eigenen Privatbüro auf.
The retired Lt. General discussing how eye opening it was to hear about the activities of the former Polish intelligence services (the SB, or Służba Bezpieczeństwa):
>Even government ministers were constantly suspected of and monitored for potential collusion with the West. Under a communist regime, even high-ranking officials were no exception. In fact, they were monitored more strictly precisely because they were high-ranking officials. This is the reality of a totalitarian state.
This is pretty standard even in Western democracies. It wouldn’t be the same level of blanket surveillance the Cold War Soviet states engaged in but the USA, and even more so, the UK, have pretty well-established protocols for elite vetting and continuous evaluation, with more serious surveillance if any potential risks are detected.
His story of a possible Chinese honey trap sounds a little implausible (not that a honeytrap is implausible, just his framing of it). The suspected agent remains quiet and refuses contact with him for six months during their lectures together (even though he tries to speak with her). Then raises his suspicion by taking photos of their lecture group on the last day. She only reappears at his office 10 months later, apparently for advice about a job interview (maybe Japan related). They talked for an hour. Afterwards she tried to contact him again by phone/email (possibly just to say thanks, ask a follow-up question, or ask for a reference, etc.) and he ignored her. It doesn’t sound very much like the the actions an asset would take in such a role, which would either be far more subtle or far more direct.
On the final page of the article we see he is promoting a just released book on the proposed establishment of a new Japanese National intelligence Agency, and a suspicious person might consider whether a former military officer, who is now interested in having some input into such things, might become creative with the danger posed by Chinese spies and his own direct experience of such things.
Terrible-Today5452 on
We had similar cases in France, maybe some are still ongoing.
Years ago, many young and attractive Chinese female students came to Brest to study. It turned out that they often frequented places where members of the French submarine forces used to go during their leave.
Some got married, and some information was allegedly stolen, although the details of the whole affair remain largely unclear.
Now, the French government is a little more careful.
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The retired Lt. General discussing how eye opening it was to hear about the activities of the former Polish intelligence services (the SB, or Służba Bezpieczeństwa):
>Even government ministers were constantly suspected of and monitored for potential collusion with the West. Under a communist regime, even high-ranking officials were no exception. In fact, they were monitored more strictly precisely because they were high-ranking officials. This is the reality of a totalitarian state.
This is pretty standard even in Western democracies. It wouldn’t be the same level of blanket surveillance the Cold War Soviet states engaged in but the USA, and even more so, the UK, have pretty well-established protocols for elite vetting and continuous evaluation, with more serious surveillance if any potential risks are detected.
His story of a possible Chinese honey trap sounds a little implausible (not that a honeytrap is implausible, just his framing of it). The suspected agent remains quiet and refuses contact with him for six months during their lectures together (even though he tries to speak with her). Then raises his suspicion by taking photos of their lecture group on the last day. She only reappears at his office 10 months later, apparently for advice about a job interview (maybe Japan related). They talked for an hour. Afterwards she tried to contact him again by phone/email (possibly just to say thanks, ask a follow-up question, or ask for a reference, etc.) and he ignored her. It doesn’t sound very much like the the actions an asset would take in such a role, which would either be far more subtle or far more direct.
On the final page of the article we see he is promoting a just released book on the proposed establishment of a new Japanese National intelligence Agency, and a suspicious person might consider whether a former military officer, who is now interested in having some input into such things, might become creative with the danger posed by Chinese spies and his own direct experience of such things.
We had similar cases in France, maybe some are still ongoing.
Years ago, many young and attractive Chinese female students came to Brest to study. It turned out that they often frequented places where members of the French submarine forces used to go during their leave.
Some got married, and some information was allegedly stolen, although the details of the whole affair remain largely unclear.
Now, the French government is a little more careful.