Warum Netanjahus Endspiel der verbrannten Erde für Trump eine Katastrophe bedeutet

Full article: [Donald Trump’s](https://inews.co.uk/topic/donald-trump?gad_source=1&gad_campaignid=23598346071&gbraid=0AAAAABfPv1rnspvJ0Br59J-C-yRtMymxl&gclid=Cj0KCQjwpv7NBhCzARIsADkIfWyQRPke0Na4lwXKDVgX2CyMG01t5BeHuTmpG5ECpaXQKgaToAo_5dsaAkhHEALw_wcB&ico=in-line_link) war in Iran is exposing widening fractures between the US and Israel that could spell danger for the credibility and power of a American President increasingly scrambling for an off-ramp.

The Iranian regime has denied Trump and [Benjamin Netanyahu](https://inews.co.uk/topic/benjamin-netanyahu?srsltid=AfmBOoozNgSW6zowRqgnUe1ZBT2C2x97zMLD8DLzU4KWv0IRK678hUfN&ico=in-line_link) a quick victory, and with [fighting now in its fourth week](https://inews.co.uk/topic/iran-crisis?ico=in-line_link), cracks are appearing.

Trump’s objectives for the war have shifted between unconditional surrender, destruction of Iran’s ballistic missile programme, its military incapacitation, sinking its navy and stopping nuclear proliferation. For Israel, the [Iran](https://inews.co.uk/topic/iran?ico=in-line_link) issue is clearer-cut: Netanyahu sees this war as a once-in-a-generation chance to destroy an existential threat.

Despite close military coordination, that divergence is now playing out on the battlefield and is only expected to widen as the war drags on. If Trump cannot secure a “win” in Iran, it is likely to be himself and the US – not Netanyahu – who will feel the most serious consequences.

# Regime change vs an off-ramp

US officials have warned that the longer the conflict lasts, the more likely it is that “endgames and risk tolerance” differ between the US and Israel, *Axios* reported.

Trump has made it known that he is still hoping for a “Venezuela” option: preserving the regime but installing a pragmatic leader amenable to US demands. After the [killing of Supreme Leader](https://inews.co.uk/news/trump-israels-killing-khamenei-played-out-4266623?srsltid=AfmBOopmEtXOGDq1UBlpYZdzydJd–O0QYv8jhHxJu_QK4qMKfP4PCjZ&ico=in-line_link) Ali Khamenei on the first day of the air strikes, Trump demanded to choose Iran’s next leader and reportedly sought out “moderates” with whom he could do a deal.

Netanyahu, on the other hand, has consistently said his central objective is regime change and eliminating the threat Iran poses to Israel. After targeting Khamenei, Israel also took out Ali Larijani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and Gholamreza Soleimani, commander of the Basij paramilitary forces, kneecapping Iran’s high-level political and strategic decision-making.

For Trump, Israel’s assassinations “could complicate, if not compromise, the Venezuela model, much less a diplomatic off-ramp and end to the conflict, by killing potential interlocutors inside the regime,” Eric Lob, a non-resident scholar in the Carnegie Middle East Programme in Washington DC, said.

Meanwhile, the US and Israel are miles apart when it comes to their tolerance for risk.

For Trump, a deadly new Middle East quagmire of the type he promised never to involve America in could deliver a devastating blow to his support back home, as well as US power on the global stage. The war is already unpopular with the US public, and [prominent anti-war voices in his Maga base](https://inews.co.uk/news/world/trump-iran-maga-fury-ahead-midterms-4267044?srsltid=AfmBOopONLNuwNRA-OjFk6UaSArRADlMNzy82oPhwHMti9-NgF-F456l&ico=in-line_link) are getting louder.

Israel, on the other hand, could tolerate a long military campaign and even a collapsed Iranian state. Reports have said the head of Israel’s Mossad intelligence service proposed a plan to foment revolts in Iran – and [invasion by Iranian Kurdish militia groups from Iraq](https://inews.co.uk/news/world/the-iranians-who-could-help-trump-probably-wont-4286318?srsltid=AfmBOopo0egNnXdKGaXbRXq-ohVWn1HD4vPraxT2q58iGx4DEh-yC_ft&ico=in-line_link) – to topple the government.

“Israel doesn’t hate the chaos. We do. We want stability. Netanyahu? Not so much, especially in Iran,” one unnamed White House official told *Axios*.

The major divergence we already see is that Israel is willing to risk the coherence of Iran for the sake of advancing its own agenda, Brian Katulis, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington DC, told *The i Paper*.

Some 40 per cent of Israel’s 8,000-plus strikes have targeted Iranian security forces and installations, disrupting and disabling command and control structures that would be used to suppress a popular uprising, officials have said. Some fear an uprising could result in the breaking up of the country, with civil war prompting chaos across the region.

I continue to see people insist that this war is not primarily driven by Israeli foreign policy goals. It’s possible to argue against this by sifting through media reports about who called who in the lead up to the war, and this is the tack most people take.

But I’d like to build a case for Israeli strategic primacy through a different route.

Place yourself in the shoes of an Israeli strategic planner, and assume that your principal strategic goal is Israeli hegemony over the Middle East. It should be uncontroversial to assert that eliminating Iran is a necessary (and perhaps the most important) component of this goal, so I’ll skip over justifying that. How can this be accomplished?

The IDF consists of 170k active duty personnel, and is suffering recruitment and retention issues. The IAF packs an outsized punch considering Israel’s size, but it’s ultimately a mid-tier air force with ~250 fighter airframes (most of which are F-16s and F-15s), no bombers and only 11 refueling tankers. The Israeli Navy is a souped-up coastal defense force and can’t be expected to operate in the Persian Gulf.

Compare this to Iran, which has a manpower pool an order of magnitude larger, tens of thousands of drones and thousands of ballistic missiles, an asymmetric naval force focused on area denial, extensive proxy forces and hugely favorable terrain for defensive operations.

There’s no chance of deploying an IDF ground component onto Iranian soil. It’s an impossible prospect on a political level for any other state in the region to support this, and Iraq and Syria stand between Israel and Iran. Even if the Iranians didn’t outnumber the IDF by a huge margin, sustaining some kind of invasion simply isn’t on the table.

The best you can do in terms of direct offensive operations is the following:

• Launch a short campaign (remember you’re limited by refueling aircraft) of aerial attacks using standoff munitions like ALBMs

• Insert agents into Iran and have them launch drones from within the country

• Try to arm and support proxy forces within Iran, or organize multiple small invasions

• Orchestrate political violence, protests, terrorist attacks, etc.

The Israelis have attempted all of these, and so far none of them have seemed to fundamentally shift the strategic picture. This leaves one option on the table: get the United States to fight Iran for you. Considering this has been an Israeli goal for decades, and one administration after another has balked at the prospect, it’s not an easy task.

You’ll draw vast sums of money out of a network of pro-Israel billionaires to influence an election. You’ll need the closest possible connections to US leadership, ideally agents within the executive’s own family. You’ll want to have your people involved in the US foreign policy apparatus, putting them in between the US government and Iran, so you can control negotiations. You’ll need people within the Department of War, though having an agent as Secretary of War would draw too much attention. Once all of this is achieved, you’ll stand a chance of orchestrating events to suck the US gradually into direct combat with Iran.

You start off by provoking the Iranians into attacking you. Hit some embassies, assassinate IRGC personnel, launch airstrikes on Tehran. Keep pushing about the dangers of an Iranian nuclear weapon, make sure the US treats it like a red line. Pressure the administration into participating in a limited strike. Bide your time when necessary, then suddenly escalate again. When it seems like an off-ramp might be coming up, find a red line and cross it. Keep going until American hegemony itself is on the line. The sunk cost fallacy will ensure events unfold in your favor until American boots hit the ground.

**This is, of course, exactly what we’re seeing.**

You can make a case that this war is really about China, or energy markets, or defense industry profits. There are sound arguments that some US interests overlap with Israeli goals. But it is *very* hard to make a case that this war isn’t significantly the result of decades of Israeli soft power, influence operations and espionage.