Das verblüffende Versagen der iranischen Abschreckung – und warum sie eine gefährlichere Welt ankündigt

[Excerpt from essay by Nicole Grajewski, Assistant Professor at Sciences Po and a Nonresident Scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and Ankit Panda, Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.]

Over the past few years, Tehran made a series of errors that proved deadly. It revealed the limits of its missile force and depended too much on its network of proxies for protection. It curbed its nuclear ambitions at what in hindsight appears to have been the most inopportune moment: when Iran was close enough to developing a bomb to invite a preventive attack but not close enough to deter one. It also publicized the progress it was making in technologies relevant to building nuclear weapons instead of holding its cards close to the chest.

Each of these errors compounded the others. Together, they led to the disaster now unfolding. For Iran’s leaders, the lessons are clear: deterrence cannot be outsourced to proxies; threats, if not credible, risk inviting retaliation; and a latent nuclear program is hardly a substitute for actually having the bomb.

You can’t establish deterrence if your army is built on crappy weapons from 60s-70s, your economy is constantly collapsing, and your own people are against you, while your rivals are using 5th generation fighters, top tier intelligence, and have strong economies that can sustain the war effort.

The only „good choice“ the IRGC could made historically, is building an actual decent country with a decent economy and decent allies.

Turns out that there’s not much deterrence a country can do from being attacked when it funds, arms, and instigates attacks against others in furtherance of its weekly chants calling for their death and destruction.

Is this article some sort of a joke? April fools isn’t until after 2 weeks right? Unprovoked aggression couldn’t be more normal, that’s totally not the problem but deterrence is. This „Iran should absolutely be attacked“ mindset of those two journalist is off-putting.

> Iran’s strategy worked for a time. But over the past few years, Tehran made a series of errors that proved deadly. It revealed the limits of its missile force and depended too much on its network of proxies for protection.

Just a blunt statement, naturally it has limits just like Operation Epic Fury reveals the limits of the U.S armed forces.

Houthis hasn’t even joined the war yet and many US Navy sailors are probably on VA paychecks from PTSD after Operation Prosperity Guardian when the Houthis absolutely startled the US Navy and its sailors and USS Harry S. Truman lost 3 F-18 Super Hornets because it had to make sharp turns to dodge missiles.

> In April 2024, in response to an Israeli attack on the Iranian embassy in Syria, Iran launched missiles at Israel for the first time. It did so again in October 2024. During both instances, Israel intercepted almost all the missiles, and U.S. and Israeli defense planners learned more about Iranian capabilities and tactics than they ever could have through satellite surveillance or signals intelligence.

„Intercepted almost all“. There were plenty of authentic clips circulating on the internet showing barrage of missiles hitting Israel during that Oct 24 attack. They did intercept many, but far from being almost all. Unhinged magazine.

But they have the world economy by the balls, that in and of itself is a successful strategy.