Die existenzielle Krise des iranischen Regimes – und was nach Khamenei kommen könnte: Ein Gespräch mit Karim Sadjadpour
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/iranian-regimes-existential-crisis-and-what-might-come-after-khamenei-trump
Die existenzielle Krise des iranischen Regimes – und was nach Khamenei kommen könnte: Ein Gespräch mit Karim Sadjadpour
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/iranian-regimes-existential-crisis-and-what-might-come-after-khamenei-trump
4 Kommentare
[Excerpt from Q&A with Karim Sadjadpour, Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.]
When historians look back at this moment in the not too distant future, they will view this not as a war of necessity but as a war of choice. There was no imminent threat of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons or launching attacks on the United States and its allies and partners in the Middle East. But both the United States and Israel see an opportunity to exploit the weakness of one of their worst adversaries. Iran does not control its own airspace as a result of last June’s war, its regional proxies are decimated, and it’s feeling existential angst as a result of the popular uprising.
Trump also has a personal stake here. In January, on at least nine occasions, he drew firm redlines, insisting that if Iran killed protesters the United States would come to their aid. Trump incited people to the streets during those protests, telling them to go seize state institutions and that help was “on the way.” For Trump, the greatest motivating factor seemed to be his own credibility, more than any imminent threat to the United States.
>Insecurity tends to benefit security forces, because when power vacuums are introduced it’s usually the men who can mobilize violence who prevail. It’s not writers and intellectuals and human rights activists who rise to the top when power vacuums form in a society.
>Around three-quarters of authoritarian transitions lead to another authoritarian form of government. And when those authoritarian transitions are triggered by either external or internal violence, the likelihood of democratic transition is much lower. The statistical odds are slim that Iran will transition to a stable representative secular democracy—even if I do believe that Iranian society is ripe for such a change.
This bit is similar to the CIA report before the attack which said Khamenei will be replaced by hardliners in case of his death.
>Internally, the regime could emerge intact and become as brutal as North Korea—even more brutal than it has been in recent weeks after killing thousands of Iranians. There’s also the possibility of state collapse and a potential civil war, given how polarized Iranians are and because of agitation among ethnic groups.
If America and Israel want to make sure the Islamic regime stay dead, there must be boots on the ground. It could be a form of coalition force including troops from neighboring states, there’s just no other way to ensure the whole thing won’t turn into chaos.
I know the Iranian regime is awful, but I see no good guy here. It just looks like power moves, gangsters moving on other gangsters, seizing an opportunity. Looking from a Canadian perspective, a Trump win, if it turns out to be one, means an emboldened and more dangerous Trump for our hemisphere.
Part of the question at this current stage is how long and how surgical vs indiscriminate will strikes be.