[SS: Argument by Steven A. Cook, a columnist at *Foreign Policy* and the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations]
Will they, or won’t they? That is the question that the Middle East-watching world has been asking for the past few weeks. Will the United States and Saudi Arabia announce the big defense pact-plus deal that officials in both countries have been working on since at least mid-2023?
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Riyadh at the end of April and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s pending visit have injected a sense of urgency and anticipation into the story of a possible agreement. According to reporting, the Saudis and the Biden administration are ready, but “obstacles remain,” which is a nice way of referring to the Israelis.
When the [discussions between officials in Washington and Riyadh](https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/06/05/saudi-arabia-israel-normalization-deal-agreement-biden-blinken-trip-security-guarantee-nuclear-energy/) began, the Biden administration clearly believed that a stand-alone agreement with Saudi Arabia would never garner adequate support on Capitol Hill. A large number of Democrats and a smaller number of Republicans in the Senate—who would need to sign off on any defense pact—would likely balk at committing the United States to the defense of Saudi Arabia. But the White House reasoned that if such a deal was wrapped around normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, congressional support was more likely.
I honestly don’t get the Saudi Arabia and Egypt comparison, they’re two separate countries in fundamentally different places at the moment. The odds of a formal security agreement between Saudi Arabia and the United States being reached right now is moderately low and even if an agreement is reached a fairly low chance of it being ratified by the US Senate right now. I think an agreement will ultimately be reached as I don’t believe the fundamentals are the issue, it’s the periphery components that are likely the current barrier.
2 Comments
[SS: Argument by Steven A. Cook, a columnist at *Foreign Policy* and the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations]
Will they, or won’t they? That is the question that the Middle East-watching world has been asking for the past few weeks. Will the United States and Saudi Arabia announce the big defense pact-plus deal that officials in both countries have been working on since at least mid-2023?
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Riyadh at the end of April and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s pending visit have injected a sense of urgency and anticipation into the story of a possible agreement. According to reporting, the Saudis and the Biden administration are ready, but “obstacles remain,” which is a nice way of referring to the Israelis.
When the [discussions between officials in Washington and Riyadh](https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/06/05/saudi-arabia-israel-normalization-deal-agreement-biden-blinken-trip-security-guarantee-nuclear-energy/) began, the Biden administration clearly believed that a stand-alone agreement with Saudi Arabia would never garner adequate support on Capitol Hill. A large number of Democrats and a smaller number of Republicans in the Senate—who would need to sign off on any defense pact—would likely balk at committing the United States to the defense of Saudi Arabia. But the White House reasoned that if such a deal was wrapped around normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, congressional support was more likely.
[Continue reading the argument here.](https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/05/08/saudi-arabia-us-deal-israel-egypt/)
I honestly don’t get the Saudi Arabia and Egypt comparison, they’re two separate countries in fundamentally different places at the moment. The odds of a formal security agreement between Saudi Arabia and the United States being reached right now is moderately low and even if an agreement is reached a fairly low chance of it being ratified by the US Senate right now. I think an agreement will ultimately be reached as I don’t believe the fundamentals are the issue, it’s the periphery components that are likely the current barrier.