Quelle: (Seiten 19-20) https://armstat.am/file/article/sv_06_25r_510.pdf
(Dieser Bericht finden Sie auf Armstat.am -> Veröffentlichungen-> "Sozioökonomische Situation von RA, Januar-Juni 2025 (Armenisch, Russisch)" -> Scrollen Sie nach unten, um "5.1. Demografische Situation" – PDF herunterladen)
Für den Farbbereich beträgt der Mindestwert 1,180 TFR (Ervan, 2024) und das Maximum 2,682 TFR (Vayots Dzor, 2024). Armstat veröffentlichte TFR für den Tausendstel. Zur einfacheren Betrachtung rundete ich mich hier auf die Hundertstel.
National TFR:
2021 – 1.709
2022 – 1.738
2023 – 1,885
2024 – 1.714 (Quelle: Seite 21 – Erste Quelle aufgeführt)
(Quelle: National TFR für 2013 – 2023 ist hier auf Seite 3 angezeigt: https://armstat.am/en/?nid=82&id=2705 – – "Teil 3: Geburten" – PDF herunterladen)
Für 2025 denke ich, dass National TFR weiter sinken wird. Für den Zeitraum von Januar – JuniDie Anzahl der Geburten stieg von 15.616 in 2024 auf 14.609 Geburten in 2025. Die Scheidungen gingen von 2.220 auf 2.352 und die Ehen stiegen von 7.540 auf 6.388.
Bearbeiten: Wieder veröffentlicht für Bilder mit höherer Auflösung.
https://www.reddit.com/gallery/1msj137
Von AdriaticLostOnceMore
7 Kommentare
Edit: Maximum value of the color range is for Vayots Dzor’s TFR in 2023***, which is **2.682**.
Would be interesting to go back a few more years, since things have been a bit weird since 2020.
And as I said in your previous post, interesting how Yerevan in 2021 seems to have gotten a strong Covid boost, and maybe a war boost too, but the regions did not.
How did it increase that much?
How can the cost of living be mitigated in Yerevan?
I couldn’t believe at first that the stats were real, because of the sharp drop in only a few years for Yerevan’s TFR.
Most cities throughout the world are sub-fertility population sinks anyways. Having too many choices for partners, high cost of living, materialism, etc …
If anything, an Academic City right outside of Yerevan might have disastrous consequences for future demographics. It might speed up rural abandonment and birth rate decline. This calls for “Chesterton’s Fence”, which says to not pick apart a fence without knowing why it was put there in the first place.It could be Armenia’s milder version of a One Child Policy. Hasty change just for the sake of progress and populism can heed unintended consequences.
What’s up with Vayots dzor?
Do Hayastancis feel a lackluster role of the Armenian Church in promoting birth rates?
Eric Hacopian once complained how little attention the Armenian Church paid to the gender-based abortions of so many female fetuses that is a huge issue in Armenia. He said this when the anti-gov Bagrat Galstanyan protests first gained traction in 2024.
Meanwhile, the Georgian Church is more involved. Here’s a [short substack](https://kaiserbauch.substack.com/p/on-pronatalism) on how the Georgian Patriarch Ilia II announced in late 2007 that he would personally baptize any child born to a family that already had at least two children. Ilia II accumulated more than 47,000 godchildren, and he would have 4 mass baptisms per year. And he basically leveraged his popularity since he was the most trusted figure in Georgia with the highest favourability among public Georgian figures & politicians (94%).
The reason Armenia’s overall fertility isn’t high is because 1/3 of the population lives in Yerevan where things are expensive and space limited. Outside Yerevan the TFR is quite good.
I feel like if the public were informed on how screwed Armenia would be if their population didn’t grow (geopolitical and economic implications), then people might have larger families. The government and church should be more proactive in encouraging people to have more kids.