**Submission statement**: in this research summary, a PhD candidate at Leiden University discusses the United States’ use of coercive diplomacy against illegitimate nuclear programs – for example, those of Libya and Iran. The author addresses two forms of coercive diplomacy: the historical example of the U.S. overthrow and eventual execution of Saddam Hussein, and the threat of raising sanctions. The author suggests that while the United States’ use of fear as a tactic proved effective against Libya, the United States suffered from its inability to negotiate with Iran concerning its own nuclear programs.
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**Submission statement**: in this research summary, a PhD candidate at Leiden University discusses the United States’ use of coercive diplomacy against illegitimate nuclear programs – for example, those of Libya and Iran. The author addresses two forms of coercive diplomacy: the historical example of the U.S. overthrow and eventual execution of Saddam Hussein, and the threat of raising sanctions. The author suggests that while the United States’ use of fear as a tactic proved effective against Libya, the United States suffered from its inability to negotiate with Iran concerning its own nuclear programs.