>All the other money he made was being collected by Upper Class; per Pemberton’s contract, the label was entitled to collect his portion of revenues (20 to 50 percent, depending on the source) until they’d fully recouped his advances as well as tens of thousands of dollars the label had invested in recording, marketing, and touring, including covering the costs of Pemberton’s flights, car rentals, and hotels.
This is standard music industry exploitation. It’s a real shame what happened to him, but this sort of indentured servitude won’t disappear unless there are regulatory barriers; because there will *always* be another bright young 19 year old who believe there are few other options available to them.
>By then, the label was essentially defunct. In a statement to The Walrus, Upper Class claimed it “never recouped its investment [in Cadence Weapon] and remains out of pocket” and that “all expenses were borne by the label and any earnings were reinvested toward his development as an artist.”
I wonder if this is not unlike how production companies in film, video games, and elsewhere operate. The model is something like this: contract to a partner for exorbitant fees, rack up the „*debt*“ and then fold the production company before the artists receive meaningful compensation. It’s an accounting shell game, a racket designed to lose money on paper while shuffling capital to a man behind the curtain.
>Throughout the 2000s, Napster and other illegal file-sharing sites flooded the market with free mp3s, contributing to the decimation of physical media sales.
That’s speculative. I’ve heard it argued that Napster increased physical media sales, and that it was the rise of streaming services that were responsible for taking a bite out of physical media. Keep in mind that Spotify launched in 2008, Napster had its final release in 2002, and Kazaa had its last release in 2006. [It certainly looks like streaming subs have recovered those lost sales](https://www.ecoustics.com/articles/riaa-music-industry-report-2021/).
>More than 100,000 songs are uploaded to streaming services every day. Each of those tracks has to compete not only with 99,999 other new ones but also against basically every song ever recorded. “You’re up against everything, from everywhere, all the time,” says Patrick Rogers, chief executive officer of Music Canada, an organization that represents the country’s major labels. “And if you’re willing to take on that challenge, the industry is in a position to help you.”
***Or***, instead of relying on labels picking a few winners, we could develop regulation that coerces streaming services to elevate Canadian, independent, and niche or new artists as a certain portion of the content that they serve algorithmically.
One of the things I ***hate*** about Spotify, Amazon Music et al is that it feels no different than listening to a Radio station, albeit without ads. It’s the same songs, eventually; pick a starting point, and in short order it will begin serving the same few dozen tracks that are popular within that genre. It’s *boring*.
Anyhow, I need to get back to work and this is a *long* article. I made it halfway, I’ll read the rest later.
But I should note it brings to mind an interesting rock documentary titled [We Are Twisted F*cking Sister!](http://twistedsisterthemovie.com/) What rang out to me in viewing it was that the era of gig-supported independent musicians began dying out in tandem with the collapse in interest in attending third spaces. Venues were *everywhere* and filling them with people meant having a live band every night the venue opened. Seven days a week, *often* several acts a night. The demand for musicians was enormous, and they didn’t *necessarily* need a record contract.
Nowadays there’s far less interest in live music in third spaces, and musicians have to contend with strong gatekeepers like Live Nation who won’t even speak to you unless you’ve got representation.
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>All the other money he made was being collected by Upper Class; per Pemberton’s contract, the label was entitled to collect his portion of revenues (20 to 50 percent, depending on the source) until they’d fully recouped his advances as well as tens of thousands of dollars the label had invested in recording, marketing, and touring, including covering the costs of Pemberton’s flights, car rentals, and hotels.
This is standard music industry exploitation. It’s a real shame what happened to him, but this sort of indentured servitude won’t disappear unless there are regulatory barriers; because there will *always* be another bright young 19 year old who believe there are few other options available to them.
>By then, the label was essentially defunct. In a statement to The Walrus, Upper Class claimed it “never recouped its investment [in Cadence Weapon] and remains out of pocket” and that “all expenses were borne by the label and any earnings were reinvested toward his development as an artist.”
I wonder if this is not unlike how production companies in film, video games, and elsewhere operate. The model is something like this: contract to a partner for exorbitant fees, rack up the „*debt*“ and then fold the production company before the artists receive meaningful compensation. It’s an accounting shell game, a racket designed to lose money on paper while shuffling capital to a man behind the curtain.
>Throughout the 2000s, Napster and other illegal file-sharing sites flooded the market with free mp3s, contributing to the decimation of physical media sales.
That’s speculative. I’ve heard it argued that Napster increased physical media sales, and that it was the rise of streaming services that were responsible for taking a bite out of physical media. Keep in mind that Spotify launched in 2008, Napster had its final release in 2002, and Kazaa had its last release in 2006. [It certainly looks like streaming subs have recovered those lost sales](https://www.ecoustics.com/articles/riaa-music-industry-report-2021/).
>More than 100,000 songs are uploaded to streaming services every day. Each of those tracks has to compete not only with 99,999 other new ones but also against basically every song ever recorded. “You’re up against everything, from everywhere, all the time,” says Patrick Rogers, chief executive officer of Music Canada, an organization that represents the country’s major labels. “And if you’re willing to take on that challenge, the industry is in a position to help you.”
***Or***, instead of relying on labels picking a few winners, we could develop regulation that coerces streaming services to elevate Canadian, independent, and niche or new artists as a certain portion of the content that they serve algorithmically.
One of the things I ***hate*** about Spotify, Amazon Music et al is that it feels no different than listening to a Radio station, albeit without ads. It’s the same songs, eventually; pick a starting point, and in short order it will begin serving the same few dozen tracks that are popular within that genre. It’s *boring*.
Anyhow, I need to get back to work and this is a *long* article. I made it halfway, I’ll read the rest later.
But I should note it brings to mind an interesting rock documentary titled [We Are Twisted F*cking Sister!](http://twistedsisterthemovie.com/) What rang out to me in viewing it was that the era of gig-supported independent musicians began dying out in tandem with the collapse in interest in attending third spaces. Venues were *everywhere* and filling them with people meant having a live band every night the venue opened. Seven days a week, *often* several acts a night. The demand for musicians was enormous, and they didn’t *necessarily* need a record contract.
Nowadays there’s far less interest in live music in third spaces, and musicians have to contend with strong gatekeepers like Live Nation who won’t even speak to you unless you’ve got representation.