Eine versteckte Kraft im Nahen Osten: Wie die Arabische öffentliche Meinung die Normalisierung mit Israel einschränkt

[SS from essay by Michael Robbins, Director and Co-Principal Investigator at Arab Barometer; and Amaney A. Jamal, Co-Founder and Co-Principal Investigator at Arab Barometer, Dean of the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs, and Edwards S. Sanford Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University.]

When Israel began to normalize relations with some of its neighbors in 2020, as part of the U.S.-brokered Abraham Accords, many analysts began to wonder whether the Palestinian cause still mattered to the Arab world. Doubts about the salience of the issue for Arabs grew in late 2023, when it appeared that Saudi Arabia might also join the accords, normalizing relations with Israel without demanding, in exchange, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

The Israeli military campaign in [Gaza](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/tags/gaza) that followed Hamas’s attack against Israel on October 7, 2023, provoked international outrage at the scale of violence used against Palestinian civilians and Israel’s blockade of humanitarian assistance to Gaza. Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank, and Israel have long endured violence and deprivation, but Arab opposition to the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories has rarely been a decisive factor in the conflict. Considering the unprecedented level of devastation this round of fighting has wreaked, many observers anticipated that anger among ordinary citizens in Arab states might lead to significant shifts in their governments’ rhetoric and policy.

Arab nations have used Israel as a cudgel and a propaganda tool for a while it will take some time to unwind that sentiment

The article isn’t very convincing, for one simple reason: Arab public opinion of Israel was always very negative. The article contains a graph purporting to show the “dramatic shift”, but it is all from unpopular to more unpopular.

Simple fact is that, whatever the population thinks, the governments of these Arab nations *knows* that in geopolitical terms Israel isn’t a real threat to them – Israeli ambitions are all about their immediate borders. The big threat in many Arab nations is resurgent Shiism, funded by Iran.

More to the point, the big threat is that the great powers, in particular the US and Russia, are growing ever more focused on other matters (and the US is particularly hard to predict). Chances are that the Arab nations may be left to their own devices at some point, and their societies and militaries are fragile.

Their choice of possible allies is thin. There is China and there is Europe; there is also Türkiye; but each of these has drawbacks.

This is why they are interested in Israel – it’s a tech powerhouse, it can’t retreat into isolationism like the US, and it has a proven military track record, particularly against powerful Shiite militias like Hezbollah. This makes it a valuable ally to have, despite the aggravation of its continual fighting with Palestinians.