Lassen Sie die Geopolitik nicht den Übergang Syriens ruinieren

[SS from essay by Volker Perthes, Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.]

In December 2024, the regime of Bashar al-Assad crumbled like a house of cards. Rebel forces led by fighters from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham overtook Aleppo, in Syria’s north, before turning south in a lightning offensive. Upon the rebels’ arrival in Damascus a little over a week later, it had become clear that the government’s security forces were not prepared to fight for the regime, and Assad, after almost 25 years in power, fled to Moscow. HTS’s leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, became Syria’s de facto head of state, appointed an interim government, and announced a timetable for the country’s political transition.

The rebel offensive benefited from careful preparation and the support of [Turkey](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/regions/turkey), which occupies territory in Syria’s north and provided the only safe access route to Idlib, where HTS was based. Even so, most observers didn’t expect the regime to collapse so quickly. They underestimated Assad’s continued dependence on the external supporters that had helped him prevail in Syria’s civil war, which began in 2011 after the state violently suppressed peaceful demonstrations. Conflicts elsewhere had made Assad’s key allies unable or unwilling to defend him: Russia was preoccupied with its war in Ukraine; Iran was debilitated and powerless to protect its proxies; and Hezbollah, in Lebanon, was weakened by its fight with Israel.

Who is the audience for this piece? Iran? Russia? Come on…