Die USA und der Iran führen einen äußerst asymmetrischen Krieg
https://www.theatlantic.com/national-security/2026/03/iran-us-asymmetrical-war/686525/?utm_source=reddit&utm_campaign=the-atlantic&utm_medium=social&utm_content=edit-promo
Die USA und der Iran führen einen äußerst asymmetrischen Krieg
https://www.theatlantic.com/national-security/2026/03/iran-us-asymmetrical-war/686525/?utm_source=reddit&utm_campaign=the-atlantic&utm_medium=social&utm_content=edit-promo
3 Kommentare
Nancy A. Youssef and Missy Ryan: “The Iran war started as a test of military capabilities and stockpiles, and the United States and Israel had the clear advantage. The U.S. brought some 20 ships and submarines to the fight—including two aircraft carriers—50,000 troops, and hundreds of planes and drones. President Trump declared that he would decide when the war would end, claiming after just days that the U.S. had won.
“But the momentum of the now three-week war has shifted dramatically since Iran effectively shut the Strait of Hormuz, stranding tankers that usually carry one-fifth of the world’s oil supply through the channel. Trump responded by dispatching reinforcements. Three amphibious ships, carrying more than 5,000 Marines and sailors, are traveling from Asia and will be in the Gulf as soon as Friday, defense officials told us. The Pentagon is preparing to dispatch 2,000 paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division, and more troops may soon get orders to deploy.
“Even that may not be enough to contain the war’s spreading damage to the global economy. Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak warned in an interview on Saturday on Israel’s Channel 13 about the prospects of reopening the strait. For such a mission, Barak said, ‘we would need to deploy two American divisions there and prepare to be there for the long haul.’ Two divisions constitute at least 20,000 troops …
“Yet Iran’s ability to keep the strait blocked—an act that the United Arab Emirates’s Industry and Advanced Technology Minister Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber has called ‘economic terrorism’ against every nation—doesn’t depend on the country defeating the American expeditionary force. The mere threat of attacks on shipping—or the occasional mine, drone, or missile that reaches a tanker in transit—may be enough for Tehran to achieve its aims. Trump began the war by talking about regime change and eliminating threats from Iran but is now trying to stabilize global energy markets that have been thrown into turmoil by the strait’s closure. The leverage over how the war will end has shifted from Washington to Tehran, and Trump is displaying new interest in negotiating with the regime …
“The strategy that Iran is pursuing now—asymmetric warfare against superior U.S. forces—is reminiscent of the methods used by Iraqi insurgents to counter American and allied militaries on the ground more than two decades ago …
“Like insurgents in Iraq, Iran doesn’t need to win outright; it needs only to endure, using limited force to impose economic and strategic damage. The U.S. and Israel, in contrast, must achieve decisive gains to avoid a strategic loss.”
Read more: [https://theatln.tc/AkjtilGu](https://theatln.tc/AkjtilGu)
I just wish one analysis would cover the negative consequences to Iran by blocking the strait. As if the rest of the world is just fine with Iran attacking civilian ships and blocking an international waterway.
Iran is on a clock too. Their strategy only works if countries weigh the war ending soon if it leads to the strait being unblocked. The longer it goes on the more workarounds are put in place lowering the threat and makes countries align against Iran for holding a substantial amount of energy hostage.
Not only is the war extremely asymmetrical – one side has been actively perfecting military and political asymmetry for decades.
Warfare itself is changing as well. There is currently a massive power shift underway between expensive high end platforms and high volumes of low cost, high tech platforms. Neither is likely to completely displace the other but there is currently no ‚magic formula‘ for fighting wars, therefore the shape of future conflicts is more unpredictable than it has been in decades.
We’ve seen some of this in terms of Iran’s use of low cost Shahed drones, but Iran is far from the level of sophistication of Ukraine or even Azerbaijan in terms of drone warfare tactics. The US also appears to be behind the curve in terms of keeping up.
Innovation normally happens when it’s the only choice, as is the situation with Ukraine. I could see countries that follow asymmetric strategies like Iran slowly catching up. It’s currently unclear whether the US military industrial complex and the US military itself will be keep up with the current pace of innovation due to their sheer scale and bureaucratic inertia. Of course the same could also be said for most other countries with traditional military structures and procurement processes.
About the only developed countries I see taking notes and actively incorporating innovations into their capability sets and standard operating procedures are the Scandinavians – particularly the Swedes.