[Excerpt from essay by Ilan Goldenberg, Senior Vice President and Chief Policy Officer at J Street. He served as Special Adviser on the Middle East to Vice President Kamala Harris from 2023 to 2024 and as Iran Team Chief in the office of the Secretary of Defense in the Obama administration from 2009 to 2012.]
It is becoming increasingly clear that the current U.S.-Israeli campaign of missile and drone strikes is not about to topple the entrenched regime. Nor will it entirely knock out Iran’s conventional capacities such that Tehran cannot interfere with passage through the Strait of Hormuz or threaten facilities vital to the global energy trade. The United States might now feel the urge to escalate, potentially using ground forces to seize Iranian facilities and territory or backing separatist forces around the country. But the risks of these forms of escalation far outweigh their possible gains. At this point, with the global economy jittering and the Middle East in convulsions, Washington’s best bet is not to further commit to a war it entered recklessly but to find a way out.
succesful_deception on
They do. Pull out completely. It would be better for the US and the world at large, for the economy, and for the GOP’s chances in future elections.
The biggest thing that will stop them from doing so isn’t really the humiliation aspect – their base will easily be made to believe that the operation was a raving success, and anyone disagreeing will be ostracized as being RINOs. The problem, I think, is that if the US pulls out now, it will leave Israel vulnerable while they’re busy in Lebanon already.
Further committing to the war though, sending ground forces even? It would be a disaster so big I can’t even put into words. Even the MAGA base will begin to turn when they start feeling the fallout from that.
RainbowCrown71 on
Foreign Affairs’ most recent Iran articles:
“America Has No Good Options on Iran”, “The Dangers of a Weak Iran”, “How America’s War on Iran Backfired”, “Iran’s Drone Advantage”
Can you see the obvious agenda being pushed?
I remember when Foreign Affairs was actually neutral and read by defense practitioners in Washington for actual cogent analysis. Now it’s just more ideological agenda pushing masquerading as IR thought, which is why they need to advertise everywhere to keep up the dwindling subscriptions.
Complex_Object_7930 on
Good is relative. But the people of Iran have no good options.
7ohnson1111 on
EPSTEIN REMINDER
boldmove_cotton on
Counterpoint: the notion that the Trump administration did not already have a good idea where this war would be after three weeks, and did not make contingencies for the most likely scenarios during the planning stages is ridiculous. You might not know what is going to happen over a long protracted war, but wargaming is generally pretty good about weighing capabilities and assessing the likely outcomes and timeline of what has been so far, a three week air campaign.
It does not surprise me that a former Obama advisor on Iran is arguing this—they favored appeasement to a war from the beginning.
I don’t think there have been many surprises once operations began. The U.S. and key allies will have considered this as the most likely scenario by week three, and they will have known that the impact on global trade would be severe, but assessed that the risks of not acting outweighed the costs.
I seriously doubt they believed that opening the straits would be on the table this far in, and it’s clear they’re going to keep striking until they are out of targets, and then find more until Iran is out of conventional abilities, or until they achieve the conditions for regime change or alteration.
whyhedge on
Wait, I thought Trump said he won on the first day
Justin_123456 on
I still haven’t any scenario that doesn’t end up with an Iranian nuclear weapons program over the next 2-5 years.
Conventional deterrence though their regional alliances failed. The Americans and Israelis have demonstrated that they cannot be trusted to hold to any diplomatic agreement, nor has rapprochement with the Gulf states restrained them.
Their threat to Hormuz and the regional infrastructure might succeed this time, but that’s going to have diminishing returns the next time the Americans/Israelis want to attack their country?
The government in Tehran has to be asking, what could the US and Israel possibly do worse than they already have, in response to openly breaking nonproliferation, and sprinting for a deployable weapon? How else does Iran successfully reestablish deterrence?
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[Excerpt from essay by Ilan Goldenberg, Senior Vice President and Chief Policy Officer at J Street. He served as Special Adviser on the Middle East to Vice President Kamala Harris from 2023 to 2024 and as Iran Team Chief in the office of the Secretary of Defense in the Obama administration from 2009 to 2012.]
It is becoming increasingly clear that the current U.S.-Israeli campaign of missile and drone strikes is not about to topple the entrenched regime. Nor will it entirely knock out Iran’s conventional capacities such that Tehran cannot interfere with passage through the Strait of Hormuz or threaten facilities vital to the global energy trade. The United States might now feel the urge to escalate, potentially using ground forces to seize Iranian facilities and territory or backing separatist forces around the country. But the risks of these forms of escalation far outweigh their possible gains. At this point, with the global economy jittering and the Middle East in convulsions, Washington’s best bet is not to further commit to a war it entered recklessly but to find a way out.
They do. Pull out completely. It would be better for the US and the world at large, for the economy, and for the GOP’s chances in future elections.
The biggest thing that will stop them from doing so isn’t really the humiliation aspect – their base will easily be made to believe that the operation was a raving success, and anyone disagreeing will be ostracized as being RINOs. The problem, I think, is that if the US pulls out now, it will leave Israel vulnerable while they’re busy in Lebanon already.
Further committing to the war though, sending ground forces even? It would be a disaster so big I can’t even put into words. Even the MAGA base will begin to turn when they start feeling the fallout from that.
Foreign Affairs’ most recent Iran articles:
“America Has No Good Options on Iran”, “The Dangers of a Weak Iran”, “How America’s War on Iran Backfired”, “Iran’s Drone Advantage”
Can you see the obvious agenda being pushed?
I remember when Foreign Affairs was actually neutral and read by defense practitioners in Washington for actual cogent analysis. Now it’s just more ideological agenda pushing masquerading as IR thought, which is why they need to advertise everywhere to keep up the dwindling subscriptions.
Good is relative. But the people of Iran have no good options.
EPSTEIN REMINDER
Counterpoint: the notion that the Trump administration did not already have a good idea where this war would be after three weeks, and did not make contingencies for the most likely scenarios during the planning stages is ridiculous. You might not know what is going to happen over a long protracted war, but wargaming is generally pretty good about weighing capabilities and assessing the likely outcomes and timeline of what has been so far, a three week air campaign.
It does not surprise me that a former Obama advisor on Iran is arguing this—they favored appeasement to a war from the beginning.
I don’t think there have been many surprises once operations began. The U.S. and key allies will have considered this as the most likely scenario by week three, and they will have known that the impact on global trade would be severe, but assessed that the risks of not acting outweighed the costs.
I seriously doubt they believed that opening the straits would be on the table this far in, and it’s clear they’re going to keep striking until they are out of targets, and then find more until Iran is out of conventional abilities, or until they achieve the conditions for regime change or alteration.
Wait, I thought Trump said he won on the first day
I still haven’t any scenario that doesn’t end up with an Iranian nuclear weapons program over the next 2-5 years.
Conventional deterrence though their regional alliances failed. The Americans and Israelis have demonstrated that they cannot be trusted to hold to any diplomatic agreement, nor has rapprochement with the Gulf states restrained them.
Their threat to Hormuz and the regional infrastructure might succeed this time, but that’s going to have diminishing returns the next time the Americans/Israelis want to attack their country?
The government in Tehran has to be asking, what could the US and Israel possibly do worse than they already have, in response to openly breaking nonproliferation, and sprinting for a deployable weapon? How else does Iran successfully reestablish deterrence?