Irans Schönwetterfreunde: Warum schiitische Milizen im Irak meist abseits bleiben

[Excerpt from essay by Elizabeth Tsurkov, Senior Nonresident Fellow at the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy and a Ph.D. candidate at Princeton University.]

Formally, the pro-Iranian Iraqi militias include over 100,000 fighters and effectively control the Iraqi state; they could, in theory, be a formidable partner fighting on Iran’s behalf. Yet even in Tehran’s hour of greatest need, the militias across the border are remaining cautious. While small Iranian-run networks within a handful of militias are engaging in limited drone and missile attacks, others have done no more than issue statements expressing support for Iran.

At their inception, these groups were more eager to engage in combat and some members and commanders shared the Iranian regime’s ideological commitments, but the militias have changed over the decades. Now, they are motivated more by material concerns than by religious zeal, and leaders and rank-and-file members alike prioritize survival above all else. I have seen what drives them up close: I spent 903 days in captivity of Kataib Hezbollah, the largest pro-Iranian militia in Iraq, and I have interviewed about a dozen politicians, journalists, personal friends of militia leaders, and former militia members who have insider knowledge of these groups. Fighting an existential war on Iran’s behalf is not what Iraq’s militiamen signed up for.