Um es gleich vorweg zu sagen: Ich bin kein Pro-Russe. Dies ist keine Verteidigung der Handlungen oder Motive Russlands.
Trotzdem sehe ich immer wieder Leute, die sagen, dass Russland das Energiesystem der Ukraine nicht vollständig abschaltet, weil es dazu nicht in der Lage ist. Ich bin mir nicht sicher, ob die Erklärung vollständig zutrifft, und ich denke, es könnte einen unbequemeren Grund geben.
Ich bin der Ansicht, dass es bei den Grenzwerten für Energiestreiks weniger um die Leistungsfähigkeit als vielmehr um die Kosten geht. Keine finanziellen Kosten, sondern strategische Kosten. Vollständige landesweite Stromausfälle über längere Zeiträume würden zu einer unmittelbaren humanitären Katastrophe führen, die eine stärkere Beteiligung und Eskalation von außen fast garantiert. Von einem kalten strategischen Standpunkt aus könnte das der Position Russlands tatsächlich mehr schaden als nützen.
Stattdessen sehen wir teilweise Stromausfälle, rollende Ausfälle, regionale Störungen und dann Pausen. Genug, um Reparaturen, Logistik, Industrie und Moral zu belasten, aber nicht genug, um eine dramatische politische oder militärische Reaktion externer Mächte zu erzwingen.
Ich behaupte nicht, dass dies moralisch, effektiv oder gerechtfertigt ist. Ich sage, es könnte Absicht sein. Zermürbungsdruck statt völliger Zusammenbruch.
Wenn jemand stichhaltige Beweise hat, die dem widersprechen, oder denkt, dass ich die Anreize hier falsch verstehe, würde ich es ehrlich gesagt gerne hören. Ich versuche, die Strategie zu verstehen, nicht sie zu entschuldigen.
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Attrition tactics(!) since summer 2023, by transforming a war of aggression into a war of position. Caused by unfulfilled arms deliveries on the part of the so-called West.
That’s what they call „propoganda for the smart.“
„Not pro russia, but Ukraine is cooked.“ „russia is holding back.“ „War of arttrition from the russian side.“ „Ukraine has no allies left.“ – these are all demoralizing pro russian takes leading to the ‚conclusion‘ that Ukraine has no chance or choice and should just surrender, because russia will win anyway, by any way – because it’s a force of nature.
Unfortunately, this line of propoganda works, for some at least.
No, I don’t have a signed testimonial by putin that russia is doing anything and everything, and just can’t defeat Ukraine. I guess for someone like you, who apparently drinks the kool-aid, nothing less can serve as „beyond reasonable doubt evidence“.
I don’t have the time or the patience to repeat the detailed debunking of these takes here – simply because I have doubts this is an honest post.
I’ll be brief: deliberate attacking of civilian infrastructure is **crimes against humanity** not ‚war of attrition‘. There’s generally a name for regimes that fight a war against civilians.
Why russians do that? Because with around 500 drones a night they can’t impact the battlefield.
The facts are, the numbers of munitions launched by russians in each volley correlate with production. Meaning, they fire **everything they have.** Could they fire more? They need to produce it first and they **can’t ramp up production** beyond what they already have, otherwise they wouldn’t **buy munitions from Iran and NK.**
Could they use other types of munitions they aren’t using? They don’t really have anything left in the sleeve. Every type of drone, bomb and missile that can be used is being used. How do I know? They fire ***anti-ship cruise missiles*** (!!!) and ground based strategic cruise missiles at cities. Other than nuclear, the only thing they aren’t using is gravitational bombs (the ones that fall on your head from the sky as Newton ordered). Why? Because their aircraft is too afraid to get closer than 70km to Ukranian positions for some reason. The reasons, by the way, are Patriot (and Western AA in general) and F16s. In comparison, in 2023 rissian aircraft was firing from 15km without significant risks (that to the point about aid and weapons).
BTW, Mariupol was reduced to rubble by gravitational bombs and Avdiivka by glide bombs launched from 40km.
The next piece of evidence is cost-effectiveness of strikes, or, more correctly, the lack of it. The russians are using the aforementioned ground-based strategic cruise missiles (Novator 9M729) and Kinjal aeroballistic missiles to strike at Ukraine’s power plants and power grid. There munitions, while having an obvious impact, cost significantly more than the targets they’re used on. What that means is **the strikes cannot be accomplished by cost effective weapon.** And no, russia doesn’t have endless supply of money to lob super expensive missiles at generators (multiple missiles at each target) that cost half of every missile. The fact these munitions in a conventional load out are used in such manner is another proof russia isn’t holding back conventionally.
TL;DR: yes russia can end Ukrainian civilian infrastructure (and all Ukranian civilians) by weapons it’s holding back. But that wouldn’t even be a war crime or crime against humanity. **It would be a nuclear holocaust.** And from this point we argue would russians launch nukes or not until we’re blue in the face. But the fact is – if they wanted to launch, they should’ve done it already.