Europa verliert das Chips-Rennen: Der Kontinent braucht mehr Zusammenarbeit mit Amerika – nicht weniger

[SS from essay by Chris Miller, Professor at the Fletcher School at Tufts University, a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, a Strategic Adviser to the GLOBSEC Geotech Center, and the author of [*Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology*](https://www.amazon.com/Chip-War-Worlds-Critical-Technology/dp/1398504092); and John Allen, Director of the GLOBSEC Geotech Center, a Strategic Adviser to Microsoft, and a Member of the Board of Directors of Polar Semiconductor. From 2011 to 2013, he commanded U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan.]

European leaders have grand ambitions to reduce the continent’s reliance on sensitive technologies from abroad. Today, they are debating an update to the European Chips Act, which was finalized in 2023 and allocated billions of euros to subsidize chip-making on the continent. The act was meant to increase Europe’s share of global chip manufacturing from ten to 20 percent by 2030, but it will likely fall short of that target by a wide margin.

A purely European supply chain for semiconductors—the sector that undergirds the digital economy and defense sector—is a fantasy that distracts from real opportunities. Many of the powerhouses of Europe’s chip industry, such as ASML, a Dutch company that makes semiconductor equipment, and Merck, a German firm that produces chemicals for chip-making, don’t manufacture semiconductors. Companies like these are cutting-edge, are often highly profitable, and draw on Europe’s industrial expertise in precision machinery, specialty chemicals, and advanced materials. Yet they are overlooked by politicians who focus on chip output.