Schneller und langsamer Kampf gegen China: Die wahre logistische Herausforderung in der Taiwanstraße

[SS from essay by Maximilian K. Bremer, retired U.S. Air Force Colonel, a Nonresident Fellow with the Reimagining U.S. Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center, and Head of Mission Engineering and Strategy at Atropos Group; and Kelly A. Grieco, Senior Fellow in the Reimagining U.S. Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center and Adjunct Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University.]

More than 80 years after Allied troops stormed the beaches of Normandy, D-Day is frequently referred to in discussions of potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Western observers often cite that historic event to highlight the formidable challenge that China’s military would face in launching an amphibious assault on Taiwan. Chinese analysts and military planners also study the Normandy landing campaign closely, looking for insights into logistics for their air and sea forces.

But the [United States](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/regions/united-states) should learn another lesson from D-Day: how to keep U.S. forces supplied under fire without relying on fixed infrastructure. In June 1944, Allied forces landed hundreds of thousands of troops and vehicles and tons of materiel on fortified beaches, secured a defensible position, and pushed inland—all without access to a single major port. What made this feat possible were cheap gliders that delivered troops and cargo too heavy for parachutes, and artificial harbors that kept the beachhead supplied. Those disposable logistics tools provided the speed and flexibility needed when permanent infrastructure and traditional supply methods such as large transport convoys became liabilities, and when delay could have proved fatal.