There are many paths to regime change in Iran. In 2020, two of us (Edelman and Takeyh) wrote an essay in [*Foreign Affairs*](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2020-04-13/next-iranian-revolution) in which we outlined a way to topple the Islamic Republic. At that time, we assumed that the use of force was off the table and that outside powers could only gradually erode the regime’s sources of strength. Israel’s attack on Iran this month has introduced a new and volatile element into the mix, but the underlying logic remains the same. In all cases of regime change, the indispensable preconditions for success are that the government becomes weaker and the populace becomes bolder.
In the past week, Israel has done a significant amount to establish the first condition. It has not just disabled key Iranian nuclear facilities but also essentially decapitated Iran’s military leadership. As of this writing, Israel has attacked 20 out of 31 provinces and killed scores of generals and scientists. It has largely spared Iran’s economic assets, although it has targeted domestic oil and gas production and distribution facilities. Critics have said that the intent of this Israeli operation is regime change, but it would be more correct to say that regime change might emerge as a collateral benefit of Israel’s offensive.
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The problem with weaker regime and bolder populace that it leads to violent clash. This can go either way, but as long as the regime enjoys from the support of significant portion of the populace, the result might be extreme violence from the regime in order to maintain grip on power. A softer transion would be more likely if there is a clear majority in the armed forces that recognises the need for a change. I’m not sure we are there yet.
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[SS from essay by [Eric Edelman](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/authors/eric-edelman), Counselor at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He served as U.S. Ambassador to Finland from 1998 to 2001, as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey from 2003 to 2005, and as U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy from 2005 to 2009; [Reuel Marc Gerecht](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/authors/reuel-marc-gerecht), Resident Scholar at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Earlier, he was an officer in the Central Intelligence Agency, where he worked on issues related to Iran; and [Ray Takeyh](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/authors/ray-takeyh), Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of [*The Last Shah: America, Iran, and the Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty*](https://www.amazon.com/Last-Shah-America-Pahlavi-Relations/dp/030021779X).]
There are many paths to regime change in Iran. In 2020, two of us (Edelman and Takeyh) wrote an essay in [*Foreign Affairs*](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2020-04-13/next-iranian-revolution) in which we outlined a way to topple the Islamic Republic. At that time, we assumed that the use of force was off the table and that outside powers could only gradually erode the regime’s sources of strength. Israel’s attack on Iran this month has introduced a new and volatile element into the mix, but the underlying logic remains the same. In all cases of regime change, the indispensable preconditions for success are that the government becomes weaker and the populace becomes bolder.
In the past week, Israel has done a significant amount to establish the first condition. It has not just disabled key Iranian nuclear facilities but also essentially decapitated Iran’s military leadership. As of this writing, Israel has attacked 20 out of 31 provinces and killed scores of generals and scientists. It has largely spared Iran’s economic assets, although it has targeted domestic oil and gas production and distribution facilities. Critics have said that the intent of this Israeli operation is regime change, but it would be more correct to say that regime change might emerge as a collateral benefit of Israel’s offensive.
The problem with weaker regime and bolder populace that it leads to violent clash. This can go either way, but as long as the regime enjoys from the support of significant portion of the populace, the result might be extreme violence from the regime in order to maintain grip on power. A softer transion would be more likely if there is a clear majority in the armed forces that recognises the need for a change. I’m not sure we are there yet.