Wer sollte Israel strategische Warnung zur Verfügung stellen? Einige Lektionen aus seiner Geschichte

Israel’s process of learning from its doctrinal and intelligence debacle preceding and during October 7, 2023, has begun in initial, preliminary steps. Beyond questions of policy, it is also likely that the structures of Israel’s decision-making, defense, and strategic intelligence processes will be examined. A [new essay](https://www.hoover.org/research/who-should-provide-israel-strategic-warning-some-lessons-its-history) from international relations scholar [Jonathan Roll](https://www.hoover.org/profiles/jonathan-roll) provides some historical insight on Israel’s past attempts to revise the structure of its formal strategic assessment mechanisms.

Roll argues that faults in the Israeli security establishment are not entirely endogenous. As he writes, „the mistakes made by the establishment in assessing Hamas, and in failing to provide decision makers with apt strategic warning before the attack and when it started, were not the result of conceptions held by the defense establishment alone. The same conceptions and assessments were shared by, and to a considerable extent originated with, Israel’s political leadership, which built its Palestinian strategy and some pillars of its regional strategy based on that assessment.“

Roll is clear that his „report should not be seen as a call for replacing Aman as the national estimator.“ At the same time, his analysis „does call for a thorough examination of this enduring question in light of the legitimate question marks raised in the past about Aman’s suitability for this task, and with an eye on potential far-reaching functional and organizational changes.“

Do you think Israel’s strategic intelligence enterprise needs wholesale restructuring or reform? How does the history Roll recounts shape your view of what’s likely to change when a full October 7 inquiry issues its conclusions? Does the United States have a version of Israel’s problem with the structure of the intelligence community, and are there any lessons from this report that could inform American security reforms?