[SS from essay by Majid Khadduri Professor of International Affairs and Middle East Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and the author of Iran’s Grand Strategy: A Political History.]
During his visit to the Middle East in May, U.S. President Donald Trump did several things that few would have predicted months or even weeks earlier. One was his surprise meeting with Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al-Shara, and the subsequent lifting of U.S. sanctions on Syria, notwithstanding Shara’s history as a leader of a militant Islamist group. Another was his decision not to include Israel on the itinerary, despite his administration’s ongoing efforts to end the war in Gaza. The trip followed the administration’s decision in early May to sign a bilateral cease-fire with the Houthis in Yemen, without consulting or including Israel. Along with Trump’s initiation of direct talks with Iran—a step that Israel adamantly opposes but Arab leaders in the Persian Gulf welcomed and even helped facilitate—these developments suggest how much the regional balance of power has changed since Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel.
The [war in Gaza](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/tags/israel-hamas-war) has altered the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. In the years before the October 7 attack, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and other Gulf states shared with Israel the perception that Iran and its alliance of proxy forces were the region’s overriding threat. They supported the first Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign on Tehran, and they began to normalize relations with Israel. Today, the situation has dramatically shifted. Twenty months into the war, Tehran appears far less of a threat to the Arab world. Meanwhile, Israel looks increasingly like a regional hegemon.
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[SS from essay by Majid Khadduri Professor of International Affairs and Middle East Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and the author of Iran’s Grand Strategy: A Political History.]
During his visit to the Middle East in May, U.S. President Donald Trump did several things that few would have predicted months or even weeks earlier. One was his surprise meeting with Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al-Shara, and the subsequent lifting of U.S. sanctions on Syria, notwithstanding Shara’s history as a leader of a militant Islamist group. Another was his decision not to include Israel on the itinerary, despite his administration’s ongoing efforts to end the war in Gaza. The trip followed the administration’s decision in early May to sign a bilateral cease-fire with the Houthis in Yemen, without consulting or including Israel. Along with Trump’s initiation of direct talks with Iran—a step that Israel adamantly opposes but Arab leaders in the Persian Gulf welcomed and even helped facilitate—these developments suggest how much the regional balance of power has changed since Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel.
The [war in Gaza](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/tags/israel-hamas-war) has altered the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. In the years before the October 7 attack, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and other Gulf states shared with Israel the perception that Iran and its alliance of proxy forces were the region’s overriding threat. They supported the first Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign on Tehran, and they began to normalize relations with Israel. Today, the situation has dramatically shifted. Twenty months into the war, Tehran appears far less of a threat to the Arab world. Meanwhile, Israel looks increasingly like a regional hegemon.