Die Taiwan -Schlampe: Abschreckung ist ein Balanceakt, und Amerika beginnt zu rutschen

[SS from essay by Oriana Skylar Mastro, Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University and a Nonresident Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and Brandon Yoder, Senior Lecturer at Australian National University and a Visiting Fellow at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University.]

As tensions rise across the Taiwan Strait, the policy debate in Washington remains fractured. U.S. strategy broadly revolves around deterring China from attacking Taiwan, and for the past three presidential administrations, it has consisted of three central components: increasing the ability of the United States and Taiwan to defend the island militarily; using diplomacy to signal U.S. resolve to protect Taiwan while also reassuring China that Washington does not support Taiwanese independence; and using economic pressure to slow China’s military modernization efforts.

But there is little consensus on the right balance among these three components—and that balance determines to some degree how deterrence looks in practice. [Some](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-06-23/beijing-still-playing-long-game-taiwan) contend that diplomatic pressure—along with military restraint, to avoid antagonizing China—will keep Beijing at bay. [Others](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/america-must-prepare-war-over-taiwan) warn that unless Washington significantly strengthens its military posture in Asia, deterrence will collapse. And a third approach, outlined [recently](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/taiwan/taiwan-fixation-kavanagh-wertheim?check_logged_in=1) in *Foreign Affairs* by Jennifer Kavanagh and Stephen Wertheim, emphasizes that bolstering Taiwan’s self-defense and enabling offshore U.S. support is the best route to sustaining deterrence while also mitigating the risk of escalation.