Diskussion: Wie viel Einfluss verschafft die Straße von Hormus dem Iran in einem regionalen Konflikt?

Some analysts interpret Iran’s regional behavior through concepts similar to the “Madman Theory” in international relations — the idea that a state deliberately cultivates unpredictability in order to deter stronger adversaries and raise the perceived cost of escalation.

Iran’s leadership likely understands that it cannot win a conventional military confrontation against the combined power of the United States and its allies. Because of this imbalance, much of Iran’s military doctrine has focused on asymmetric warfare and indirect pressure rather than direct confrontation.

A central element of this approach is the regional network often described as the “Axis of Resistance.” This loose alignment includes groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and other actors aligned with Tehran’s strategic interests. This structure allows Iran to apply pressure across multiple fronts while avoiding a direct state-to-state war.

Another important factor is the global energy system.

The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the most critical chokepoints in the world economy. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, roughly 20% of global petroleum consumption passes through the strait each day. Even the perception that this route could be disrupted has historically caused significant volatility in global oil markets.

Because of this, instability in the Persian Gulf carries global economic consequences. Energy analysts frequently warn that serious disruption to shipping in the strait could trigger sharp increases in oil prices and place economic pressure on governments involved in regional conflict.

From this perspective, Iran’s actions — including proxy attacks, pressure on U.S. military presence in the region, and threats to maritime security — may serve a broader strategic purpose: raising the economic and political cost of escalation.

Another element sometimes discussed by analysts is regime survival planning. Iran’s leadership has periodically emphasized institutional continuity and succession mechanisms in the event of crisis or conflict.

If this interpretation is correct, Iran’s strategy may not be centered on winning a conventional war. Instead, it may aim to:

• avoid direct confrontation with militarily superior opponents

• apply pressure through asymmetric and proxy capabilities

• create instability across multiple regional fronts

• raise global economic stakes through energy market risk

In that sense, the objective may be less about battlefield victory and more about deterrence through strategic risk and economic pressure.

Curious how others here interpret this dynamic.

Do you see Iran’s behavior as a deliberate strategy of controlled escalation and economic deterrence, or primarily as reactive responses to ongoing regional conflicts?

It’s not only the strait. Iran has demonstrated that they are in a position to slit the Achilles tendon of the global economy at will. With drones and missiles, they can destroy the water and fossil fuel production/distribution networks around the Gulf. U.S. assets can defend against that, but they can’t defend enough. Something will always get through.

Now this scenario would mean the doom of Iran as well, but that’s a deal the Islamic Republic is prepared to make. Their only real goal is to keep power, and they’re willing to commit national suicide if losing it is the alternative.

it’s probably the right strategy for iran. israel and usa expected iran to only attack israel and us bases. but their anti-air defense is too good.

the war would have been ignored by the gulf monarchy countries, or even say saudi arabia would have hoped for a longer war to completely destroy iran. France, britain etc.. were probably indifferent to the war

by attacking the oil refineries, tanker ships, threatening to attack the water desalination plants all the gulf monarchy countries are now begging for the war to end early. china is now thinking about intervening more not less. the european countries are also now afraid about high oil prices

I guess Saudi Arabia could technically intervene more, but they have a bunch of soft targets with their oil fields and water desalination plants. that makes them pretty hesitant to enter the war directly

It’s the Ace of Spades. And Iran currently holds it.

Anybody has in cards reenactment of 1956 Suez by coalition of Gulf countries + USA [trump already said that he wants to take over it) ?

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suez_Crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suez_Crisis)