Viele sagen, die Deflation in China sei ein Spiegelbild der Deflation in Japan nach dem Platzen der Blase im Jahr 1990. Aber China scheint nicht aus den Fehlern Japans gelernt zu haben, und da seine notleidenden Kredite auf staatlicher Ebene angesiedelt sind, kann es sie nicht deklarieren und bearbeiten, ohne das Versagen von Xi, der KPCh und den lokalen Regierungen einzugestehen

China’s real estate sector and high-speed rail sector are likely to be burdened by massive accumulated debt in the future. Continued overinvestment, driven by rapid aging, a declining birth rate, and overall population decline, will inevitably come back to cause serious problems.

High-speed rail is often highlighted as a symbol of China’s development, but the number of passengers per kilometer is clearly far too low. Because of this, the sector’s future looks grim. According to reports by Nikkei and other sources, hidden debt in the high-speed rail sector alone is already estimated at about 130 trillion yen, and when other sectors are included, total hidden debt is said to reach 1,400 trillion yen.

It will be interesting to see whether China can carry out reforms similar to those Japan implemented, when Japanese National Railways was privatized into the JR Group and many unprofitable rural lines were shut down.