Schweden erwägt französisch-britische Atomwaffenkooperation

For Sweden to make some? For political commitments to be covered by the French and British weapons? Or something like nuclear sharing? Bit unclear there. I think the article implies the latter most strongly, but I’m not certain

I believe this is a completely normal discussion.
The United States has begun demanding too much in exchange for security guarantees under its nuclear umbrella—up to and including territorial concessions and economic preferences.

Why shouldn’t Europe have an alternative, European option?
This isn’t about deploying nuclear weapons on Swedish soil, but reading between the lines, Sweden appears willing to prepare the infrastructure to host non-American nuclear weapons and possibly contribute financially to developing new—and upgrading existing—French and British nuclear arsenals.

I still think we need a nuclear umbella on the EU level, that protects everyone in the EU and is financed by everyone in the EU. 20+ nuclear programs is just a waste of money and everyone, especially the Baltics and Finland, really need that. It would also be a great reason to be in the EU.

>Historically, France has regarded its nuclear weapons solely as a national guarantee of security, but Macron has launched a debate about extending this protection to European allies — including through [coordination with the United Kingdom](https://breakingdefense.com/2025/07/france-and-uk-pledge-new-storm-shadow-missile-orders-deepen-nuclear-cooperation/) and discussions on a European dimension to France’s vital interests.

It’s funny how misunderstood is the French nuclear deterrent. Macron has said nothing new there. The deterrent is to protect the vital interests of France, which have included a European dimension for a very long time.

>- But the European dimension is also evident in our nuclear deterrence.
– Strengthening our cooperation in this area with Great Britain is crucial for the future. At the last Franco-British summit, we emphasized the very close alignment of our vital interests.
– The French and British deterrent forces have a specific role to play within the framework of the common security policy. This is not, of course, about replacing American deterrence with a French or Franco-British guarantee. What we want is a strengthening of overall deterrence.
– This cooperation is part of the „concerted deterrence“ framework that the Prime Minister outlined for you in September. It is neither about unilaterally expanding our deterrence nor about imposing a new contract on our partners. It is about fully realizing the implications of a shared destiny, of the increasing interconnectedness of our vital interests.

Google translate of Jacques Chirac, President, in 1996. But it could have been any president.

[https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/150114-discours-de-m-jacques-chirac-president-de-la-republique-sur-la-reform](https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/150114-discours-de-m-jacques-chirac-president-de-la-republique-sur-la-reform)

A European dimension to the vital interests of France has been mentioned officially since Pompidou. But there will never be a formal guarantee, it is not how French deterrent works, the vital interests have never been explicited and are up to the president to decide. Ultimately, promises are worth nothing anyway. Will a US promise be held by Trump? A UK one by Farage?

The next sentence is also very telling (still on nukes of course):

>- Given the differing attitudes towards nuclear weapons that exist in Europe, we are not proposing a finished concept, but a gradual approach, open to partners who wish to participate.

A good paper on the history of the european dimension of the french deterrent: [https://shs.cairn.info/revue-l-europe-en-formation-2022-2-page-143?lang=en](https://shs.cairn.info/revue-l-europe-en-formation-2022-2-page-143?lang=en)